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CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE EXECUTION
CHAMBER: WHY DEATH ROW INMATES’
SECTION 1983 CLAIMS DEMAND
REASSESSMENT OF LEGITIMATE
PENOLOGICAL OBJECTIVES
The worst sin towards our fellow creatures is not to hate them,
but to be indifferent to them: that’s the essence of
inhumanity.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Lawful capital punishment must be neither reckless nor ignorant in
its means or ends.2 Historically, excessiveness in capital killings was the
norm.3 In modern times, by contrast, the death penalty (or aspects
George Bernard Shaw, THE DEVIL’S DISCIPLE, act 2 (1901), reprinted in THE OXFORD
DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS, 706 (Elizabeth Knowles ed., 5th ed. Oxford Univ. Press 1999).
2
See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99 (1958) (stating that “the existence of the death
penalty is not a license to the Government to devise any punishment short of death within
the limit of its imagination”). But see Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910)
(asserting the general concept of legislative deference, which permits judicial intervention
only in cases where punishments are potentially unconstitutional); John H. Gordon, Jr.,
Note, Criminal Procedure—Capital Punishment—Texas Statutes Amended to Provide for
Execution by Intravenous Injection of a Lethal Substance, 9 ST. MARY’S L.J. 359, 363 n.47 (19771978):
When . . . the means adopted [to administer the death penalty] are
chosen with . . . intent, and are devised for the purpose of reaching the
end proposed as swiftly and painlessly as possible, . . . they are not
forbidden by the constitution, although they should be discoveries of
recent science and never should have been heard of before.
Gordon, supra (quoting In re Storti, 60 N.E. 210, 210-11 (Mass. 1910)). Likewise, the risk of
an accident occurring in the execution process is always present, so the process does not
need to be flawless for the procedure to be constitutional. Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662,
687 (9th Cir. 1994).
3
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (prohibiting excessive punishment). Some
scholars have shown that the Code of Hammurabi, a document roughly 4000 years old,
was favorable toward capital punishment. Robert J. Sech, Hang ‘Em High: A Proposal for
Thoroughly Evaluating the Constitutionality of Execution Methods, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 381, 387
(1995); see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 317 n.8 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring)
(describing embellishments on the punishment of death in England, including torture, the
“Bloody Assizes” of the late fifteenth century, and “attainder”—a decedent’s forfeiture of
legal rights in property).
When this country was founded, memories of the Stuart horrors were
fresh and severe corporal punishments were common. Death was not
then a unique punishment. The practice of punishing criminals by
death, moreover, was widespread and by and large acceptable to
society. Indeed, without developed prison systems, there was
frequently no workable alternative.
1
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thereof) offends the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel and
unusual punishment” if it is either grossly disproportionate to the crime
or criminal involved or does not measurably advance a legitimate
penological objective when measured against evolving standards of
decency.4 For roughly the last century, only gross disproportionality,
one of the Eighth Amendment’s two prohibitions, has been expounded
upon in death penalty jurisprudence.5 This Note proposes, instead, that
addressing legitimate penological interests should be the next focus of
capital punishment jurisprudence.6
Recent death row inmates’ Section 1983 civil rights causes of action
suggest that penological objectives must be adequate responses to
specific Eighth Amendment allegations.7 Section 1983 claims concern
inmate “circumstances of confinement,” which, when interpreted
Id. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring); Marla L. Domino & Marcus T. Boccaccin, Doubting
Thomas: Should Family Members of Victims Watch Executions?, 24 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 59,
61-63 (2000). From the mid-1600s to the late 1800s, when guillotine, quartering, stoning,
whipping, and hanging executions were common, public executions were a community
event where, “much like a county fair, . . . it was common for families to attend . . .
together, children and picnic basket in tow.” Domino & Boccaccin, supra, at 62.
“Punishment philosophy hinged upon humiliation of the accused—undoubtedly
stimulated by audiences anxiously awaiting remorse-laden confessions by the criminal.”
Id.
4
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182-83 (1976); Coker, 433 U.S. at 592 n.4. The Eighth
Amendment reads: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. See Abdur’Rahman v.
Bredesen, 181 S.W.3d 292, 306 (Tenn. 2005) (describing the components of method-ofexecution analysis).
5
See Timothy S. Kearns, Note, The Chair, The Needle, and the Damage Done: What the
Electric Chair and the Rebirth of the Method-of-Execution Challenge Could Mean for the Future of
the Eighth Amendment, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 197, 198-99 (2005). See infra Part II.B.2.
6
See discussion infra Parts III, IV.
7
See Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 643 (2004). “[Section] 1983 would be an
appropriate vehicle for an inmate who is not facing execution to bring a ‘deliberate
indifference’ challenge . . . . We see no reason on the face of the complaint to treat
prisoner’s claim differently solely because he has been condemned to die.” Id. at 644-45.
United States Code Section 1983 (as amended in 1871) states, in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought
against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s
judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.
Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). See infra Part II.C.2.
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simultaneously with the phrase “cruel and unusual punishment,” permit
inmates to challenge the extra-punishment components of their
executions.8 The theme of this Note is that Section 1983 nuances on
death penalty procedures must in turn alter Eighth Amendment
analysis, correcting a traditionally narrow-minded conception of
“legitimate penological interests” under habeas jurisprudence while
retaining the essence of longstanding method-of-execution formulae.9
Within that proposed framework, every condition or aspect of a death
row inmate’s treatment, prior to the necessary pains attendant to death
itself, which itself presents an unnecessary and substantial risk of pain
and suffering, should be strictly penological and legitimately necessary
to be justly imposed.10
To reach a conclusion favoring only legitimate penological interests
over alleged Eighth Amendment deprivations, this Note first describes
the background of capital punishment jurisprudence, particularly its
development from Eighth Amendment claims brought by writ of habeas
corpus to more recent accommodations for Eighth Amendment claims
brought by Section 1983, followed by other developments relevant to
Section 1983 that affect the death penalty.11 The following analysis
chronicles the significant changes which Section 1983 capital punishment
litigation permits, specifically, a more responsible notion of “legitimate
penological interests.”12 The final portion of this Note offers a judicial
test to weigh the constitutional rights of condemned prisoners against
the government’s procured penological interests.13 The proposed test
concludes with some specific challenges for judges, lawmakers, and

8
Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004) (explaining conditions or circumstances
of confinement actions).
The final principle inherent in the [cruel and unusual punishment]
Clause is that a severe punishment must not be excessive. A
punishment is excessive under this principle if it is unnecessary: The
infliction of a severe punishment by the State cannot comport with
human dignity when it is nothing more than the pointless infliction of
suffering.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 279 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (considering
challenges to extra-punishment conditions). See infra notes 131-35 and accompanying text.
9
See discussion infra Part II.B.3 (introducing traditional death penalty penological
interests).
10
See discussion infra Part III.A.
11
See discussion infra Part II.
12
See discussion infra Part III.
13
See infra Part IV.
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administrators toward the end of advancing both legitimate penological
interests and death row inmates’ constitutional and civil rights.14
II. BACKGROUND
What follows is essentially a chronological overview of capital
punishment jurisprudence.
Part II.A describes an overarching
competition and balance between prisoners’ constitutional rights and the
governmental right to impose the death penalty and defines “cruel and
unusual punishment.”15 Part II.B discusses the traditional judicial
analysis for death row inmates’ claims for post-conviction relief, which
challenge capital punishment as a whole, in part to demonstrate that
test’s compatibility with present-day challenges to pre-punishment
conditions of confinement.16 Finally, Part II.C charts the development of
legitimate penological interests in the realm of conditions of confinement
challenges, which, in addition to the traditional Eighth Amendment
analysis, gives context to the recent death penalty conditions decisions
explained thereafter.17
A. An Introduction to the Eighth Amendment and Other Basic Rights of
Prisoners
Death row inmates do not by virtue of their guilt forfeit their
constitutional rights entirely.18 From very early on, several states
prohibited certain torturous or inhumane forms of execution.19 In light
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part II.A.
16
See infra Part II.B.
17
See infra Part II.C.
18
E.g., Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974) (stating that prisoners retain First
Amendment rights where not inconsistent with inmate status or legitimate penological
objectives). See RANDALL COYNE & LYN ENTZEROTH, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS 61 (3d ed. 2001). A person’s constitutional rights are entitlements
safeguarded by substantive and procedural due process of the Fifth Amendment (applied
to federal government) and the Fourteenth Amendment (applied to states), unless and until
properly denied. Id. “[T]he Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments clearly countenance the
death penalty [, yet] [b]oth provide that no person shall be deprived ‘of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.’” Id.
19
See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 319 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring) (stating that,
in 1776, Virginia, followed quickly by other states, first adopted the English Bill of Rights of
1689 and did so verbatim); COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 18, at 61. Among the first and
only recorded prohibitions of inhumane punishment in the United States, prior to the Bill
of Rights being enacted in 1791, was elimination of the death penalty by live burning of
female felons in 1790. COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 18, at 61. Capital punishment was
used prior to and after the Bill of Rights was ratified with only Eighth Amendment-type
cruel and unusual punishment limitations. Id.
14
15
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of more standardized and expansive Bill of Rights’ guarantees which
followed, the Supreme Court has said that prisoners reserve whatever
rights are not reasonably taken away in furtherance of penological
objectives.20 Of these rights, capital punishment precedent has tended to
consider only death row prisoners’ Eighth Amendment freedom from
“cruel and unusual punishment.”21
Though it evades exact definition, unconstitutional cruel and
unusual punishment has been summed up as the calculated infliction of
either unnecessary pain and suffering or lingering death.22 When
20
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (citing In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447
(1890) and Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135-36 (1879), each prescribing the penological
justification component); see Pell, 417 U.S. at 822 (stating that penological interests are
legislative objectives provided to correctional systems administrators as the authority to
divest prisoners of various rights); Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948) (“Lawful
incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and
rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system.”); BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 1155 (7th ed. 1999) (defining “penology” as either the study of criminal
punishment—of deterrence, rehabilitation, reform, and prison management—or as a
branch of criminology dealing with penal institutions). See generally COYNE & ENTZEROTH,
supra note 18 (regarding retained prisoners’ rights).
21
See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishment was directly adopted from the English Declaration of Rights in 1689,
which in turn was based upon the Magna Carta. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958). See
discussion infra Part II.B.
22
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99-100 (1958). Cruel and unusual punishment is whatever
is unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain or is otherwise “calculated to cause
unnecessary pain or lingering death.” Gordon, supra note 2, at 360 (citing Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 447; Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 135). See also
Furman, 408 U.S. at 279. The terms “cruel” and “unusual” are intentionally not static
references to only that which was considered unlawfully inhumane at the time the
Constitution was framed. Id. “The Clause may be therefore progressive, and is not
fastened to the obsolete, but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened
by a humane justice.” Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910). “The question, in
any event, is of minor significance; this Court has never attempted to explicate the meaning
of the Clause simply by parsing its words.” Furman, 408 U.S. at 277. By this model, the
concepts of cruelty and unusual punishment, if courts are so urged by the public sentiment,
could certainly regress, as occurred, for example, when the electric chair was first
implemented to execute William Kemmler in New York in 1890. See Kearns, supra note 5,
at 200-01, n.38 (describing the attention drawn to electrocution by celebrities like Thomas
Edison). Kemmler’s execution, and many electrocutions that followed, occurred at a time
when the nation was fascinated with the scientific innovation the electric chair represented,
though most courts and laypeople alike knew very little about the properties of electricity
and its effect on human bodies. Id.; CRAIG BRANDON, THE ELECTRIC CHAIR: AN
UNNATURAL HISTORY 67-88 (1999) (chronicling the “Battle of the Currents,” from
electrocution’s testing phase on horses, calves, and dogs to its human application).
According to the New York Supreme Court at the time, “[I]t detracts nothing from the force
of the evidence in favor of this conclusion that we do no know the nature of electricity, nor
how it is transmitted in currents, nor how it operates to destroy the life of animals and men
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initially adapted from English law, the words “cruel” and “unusual”
merely explained one another; whereas, today, these words have
independent significance.23 Far from prohibiting only torture or physical
barbarity, cruel punishment is essentially any which is wantonly or
recklessly inflicted.24
Unusual punishment is punishment not
standardized in policy or procedure to eliminate the serious risk of
unnecessary pain and suffering.25 In sum, in Coker v. Georgia, the
Supreme Court declared cruel and unusual punishment coextensive with
excessiveness, in that excessive punishment either does not contribute to
exposed to its force.” Kearns, supra note 5, at 201 (quoting People ex. rel. Kemmler v.
Durston, 7 N.Y.S. 813, 818 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1889)). Upon review of the decision, a higher
court described the state Supreme Court’s lack of objective skepticism as alarming. Id.
23
Anthony F. Granucci, “Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted”: The Original
Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839, 860 (1969). The framers’ use of “cruel and unusual” did not
intend to categorically deny any method of punishment, only “severe punishment
unauthorized by statute and not within the jurisdiction of the court to impose.” Id. At that
time, the phrase implied simple illegality and did not carry the same connotations of
barbarity as today. Id. Indeed, the seventeenth century definition of “cruel” merely meant
severe or hard. Furman, 408 U.S. at 318-19 n.13 (Marshall, J., concurring). But see Walton v.
Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 670 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that, separately, the words
“cruel” and “unusual” mean nothing of constitutional significance). According to the
concurrence in Walton, a proportionality of sentencing case, the only “excessive”
punishment is both cruel and unusual and no amount of one can compensate for the lack of
the other. Id. “[T]hat is to say, the text [of the Eighth Amendment] did not prohibit a
traditional form of a punishment that is rarely imposed, as opposed to a form of
punishment that is not traditional. Id.
24
Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 447 (holding that cruelty includes not torture alone but also
whatever is “inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of
life”); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 171 (not only about deciphering what is “barbarous”); Furman, 408
U.S. at 322 (Marshall, J., concurring). The Supreme Court said in Louisiana ex rel Francis v.
Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463 (1947), that “[t]he cruelty against which the Constitution
protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method of punishment, not the
necessary suffering involved in any method employed to extinguish life humanely.”
Gordon, supra note 2, at 359 n.5. See also id. at 360 n.12 (providing examples of execution
methods that have been termed “torturous punishment” and were thus rather swiftly
prohibited in the United States, including: drawing and quartering, cutting off ears and
limbs, burning alive, starvation, boiling alive, and disemboweling).
25
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 n.32 (1958). “If the word ‘unusual’ is to have any
meaning apart from the word ‘cruel,’ . . . the meaning should be the ordinary one,
signifying something different from that which is generally done.” Id. See also Furman, 408
U.S. at 242 (Douglas, J., concurring) (describing how procedures are “unusual” if they
discriminate upon either an unlawful basis such as race or a lawful basis like social class or
wealth); Granucci, supra note 23, at 860 (explaining “usual” punishment as proven, codified
punishment); Gordon, supra note 2, at 363 n.46 (“The word ‘unusual’ . . . cannot be taken so
broadly as to prohibit every humane improvement not previously known.”); Constitutional
Law—Second Electrocution Attempt Not Violation of Constitutional Prohibition against Cruel and
Unusual Punishment, 33 VA. L. REV. 348, 349 (1947) [hereinafter Second Electrocution Attempt]
(“[B]ut punishment that is greater than has been described, known or inflicted is cruel and
unusual.”).
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a legitimate penological objective, as when it results in a serious risk of
gratuitous pain or suffering, or makes a criminal’s sentence grossly
disproportionate to his or her wrongdoing.26 Regarding execution
specifically, “cruel and unusual” likewise encompasses whatever surplus
risk of pain and suffering unnecessarily accompanies the death penalty,
where unjustified by legitimate penological interests.27
B. Traditional Method-of-Execution Analysis during Habeas Corpus Primacy
To safeguard the Eighth Amendment rights of condemned persons,
the Supreme Court has traditionally relied upon a three-part “methodof-execution” balancing test.28 Method-of-execution analysis considers
the following: (1) evolving societal standards of decency; (2) the
appropriate proportion of a criminal’s sentence compared to the crime(s)
committed; and (3) the legitimacy of penological objectives for the death
penalty imposed.29 Although the Court has only intermittently utilized
this test explicitly over the last century,30 determining cruel and unusual

433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
Id.; see Gordon, supra note 2, at 364 (“The substance and procedures selected to
perform the execution must not inflict undue pain or cause lingering death in order to
withstand the expected [E]ighth [A]mendment challenge.”); see also Francis, 329 U.S. at 463.
28
Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 643; Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1879); see
Kearns, supra note 5, at 198 nn.10-11.
29
See, e.g., Abdur’Rahman v. Bredesen, 181 S.W.3d 292, 306 (Tenn. 2005). In practice, the
standards of decency prong of analysis operates primarily as the measuring stick for what
constitutes grossly disproportionate punishments. See, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277,
288 (1983) (holding a seven-time non-violent felony offender unconstitutionally sentenced
to life imprisonment without parole under the Eighth Amendment). Otherwise, it
measures whether a punishment advances acceptable penological objectives. See Coker, 433
U.S. at 592 n.4 (citing the legislative decisions of States and foreign countries aggregately,
holding that the death penalty for rape of an adult woman was deemed both grossly
disproportionate and a failed rationale when tested for being “an indispensable part of the
States’ criminal justice system”); see also COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 18, at 61.
30
The first, most explicit invocation of this Eighth Amendment balance was the
Supreme Court’s decision in Wilkerson v. Utah, in 1879, to declare Utah’s firing squad an
unconstitutional method of execution. 99 U.S. 130 (1879). Although the analysis was not
ignored wholesale in the century that followed, post-Wilkerson, the Supreme Court avoided
making any further method-of-execution resolutions until its 2005 decision of Roper v.
Simmons. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). Kearns, supra note 5, at 198-99.
In assessing whether a punishment is cruel and unusual, the Supreme
Court has taken a number of methods: . . . in death penalty cases,
whether the method of executing the death sentence is cruel and
unusual. This last category, which is termed method-of-execution
analysis, has largely languished at the Supreme Court level, with no
cases directly engaging in method-of execution analysis in 115 years.
Id. The dearth of method of execution claims is difficult to explain since Trop, however, as
all the Circuit courts have agreed that Trop’s standards of decency test applies to the
26
27
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punishment has essentially remained the same, largely owing to the fact
that, historically, death row inmates’ sole cause of action was the petition
for writ of habeas corpus.31 The following sub-sections examine the
prevailing habeas and method-of-execution avenue for death penalty
relief.
1.

Standards of Decency

Eighth Amendment jurisprudence prescribes consideration of
societal values because, in actuality, the values of citizens continually
temper governmental interests.32 Early on, the Supreme Court had ruled
on various occasions that torturous forms of punishment were inherently
indecent; the de facto measurement for Eighth Amendment violations
was the Justice’s own judgment.33
Bearing heavily on judicial
interpretations were the press and public, who had traditionally
overseen and scrutinized execution proceedings, and, prior to the 1830s,
were rarely so indirectly involved as to merely cast their ballots for
legislative decisions on their behalf.34 During the course of the next
methods of implementing executions as opposed to the sentencing phase of a death penalty
trial. Id. at 222.
31
Id. at 198-99. “Postconviction proceedings are usually seeking a writ of habeas corpus,
and the terms will be used interchangeably in this section.” LINDA E. CARTER & ELLEN
KREITZBERG, UNDERSTANDING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT LAW 197 (2004) (commenting on the
symbiosis between habeas and post-conviction relief). See U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
“The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases
of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.” Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254
(2000). “Habeas corpus,” in Latin, means “have the body.” COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra
note 18, at 755. The purpose of habeas challenges, like others for state post-conviction
relief, focuses on “whether or not a conviction and sentence has been illegally obtained.”
Id. at 730 n.3. Claims challenging the very fact of an impending death penalty upon oneself
or the length of time one is imprisoned for are core to habeas corpus and must be brought
under the habeas statute, Section 2254. Nelson, 541 U.S. at 643 (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973)). But see Hill v. McDonough, 126 S. Ct. 2096 (2006). Eighth
Amendment claims fall outside the core of habeas where an inmate seeks injunctive relief
from being executed by the state “in the manner they currently intend . . . . [where] the
anticipated protocol allegedly causes ‘a foreseeable risk of . . . gratuitous and unnecessary’
pain.” Id.
32
See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (“The Amendment must draw its meaning
from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”)
(emphasis added); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (stating that generalized
opinions of experts cannot weigh as heavily in determining contemporary standards of
decency as the public attitude toward a given sanction); see also Kearns, supra note 5, at 20001, 202 n.38 (describing society’s enamorment with the electric chair and New York courts’
uncritical employment of the chair).
33
See Gordon, supra note 2, at 360.
34
Domino & Boccaccin, supra note 3, at 63 (describing a significant history of public
attendance at executions prior to the electric chair and how clergy or public officials often
explained to attendees their integral role as witnesses). Public attendance of this vigor
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century, however, jurisdictions nationwide restructured executions so as
to restrict admission of public witnesses by means of private execution
statutes and the decision to move the death penalty into small, inner
chambers.35 Despite the less direct public involvement in the death
penalty that ensued, maturing societal conceptions of human dignity
have periodically caused state and federal judiciaries to reconsider their
approaches toward capital punishment and to implement more humane
methods of execution.36

remains the norm in the trial context. The Supreme Court, in Richmond Newspapers v.
Virginia, recognized that public access to the judicial processes has a “specific structural
significance” in assuring “fair and accurate adjudication” and is supported by “the weight
of historical practice.” 448 U.S. 555, 594, 598 (1980). Additionally, that Court held that
“[s]ecrecy is profoundly inimical to this demonstrative purpose of the trial process,” and
“[p]ublic access is essential . . . if trial adjudication is to achieve the objective of maintaining
public confidence in the administration of justice.” Id. at 595. Consequently, the public’s
right and interest in access to trials cannot be obviated unless there is a compelling
government interest, narrowly tailored to serve that interest. Id.; Globe Newspaper Co. v.
Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
35
Domino & Boccaccin, supra note 3, at 63. States in the Northeast began the move to
privatize executions, and nationwide this shift was nearly complete by the early 1900s. Id.
at 63; see also John D. Bessler, Televised Executions and the Constitution: Recognizing a First
Amendment Right of Access to State Executions, 45 FED. COMM. L.J. 355, 361-62 (2000). The last
two recorded public executions were in August 1936 and May 1937. Domino & Boccacin¸
supra, at 64. But see id. at 63 (describing several instances in the 1800s in which executions
of infamous criminals revitalized public interest in executions, at times drawing viewers in
the tens of thousands, thus challenging the premise of limited attendance regulations);
Robert Perry Barnidge, Jr., Comment, Death Watch: Why America was not Allowed to Watch
Timothy McVeigh Die, 3 N.C. J. L. & Tech. 193 (describing how thousands of interested
families of victims of the Oklahoma City bombings were not allowed to watch the federal
execution of domestic terrorist Timothy McVeigh in 2001). See, e.g., COYNE & ENTZEROTH,
supra note 18, at 76. Today, most capital punishment jurisdictions specify a finite number
of persons who may attend executions, according to their relationship to the offender, the
offender’s victim(s), and the correctional system. Domino & Boccaccin, supra, at 64.
Approximately twelve states regulate attendance by quantity alone and not by function. Id.
at 64 nn.37-38. One such private execution statute, the Texas Department of Corrections
Procedures for the Execution of Inmates Sentenced to Death (protocol dating back to Texas’
adoption of lethal injection in 1982) provides that the only personnel permitted at an
execution are the Huntsville warden’s own operations personnel, a medically trained
individual (not to be identified), certain designated members of the press, a justice of the
peace, an attending physician, an inmate’s chaplain (if so desired), and certain other state
delegates. Id.
36
See Casey Lynne Ewart, Use of The Drug Pavulon in Lethal Injections: Cruel and
Unusual?, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1159, 1162 (2006) (arguing that America’s preferred
methods of execution have always changed “[a]s a result of . . . public distaste” or due to
“the public’s focus shifted from punishment to rehabilitation,” or for like reasons).
Preferred methods of execution in “Post-Revolutionary America” evolved in this order:
hanging, the electric chair, lethal gas, firing squad, and lethal injection. Id. at 1162-66. See
also infra note 233.
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Guided by earlier judicial ideals, the Court determined in Trop v.
Dulles, in 1958, that method-of-execution analysis is concerned with an
execution method’s humaneness in light of “the dignity of man” and the
“evolving standards of decency . . . of a maturing society.”37 Evolving
standards of decency analysis evaluates the public consciousness
through the aggregate position of state legislatures as objective criteria
and both international law and a court’s own sense of substantial shifts
within and among the states as subjective criteria.38 The subjective
inquiries were retained to champion society’s death penalty influence
and its maturation in the event that society’s progress conflicts with
lethargic legislative standards.39

37
356 U.S 86, 100-01 (1958). In doing so, the Supreme Court in Trop reiterated a much
earlier Supreme Court decision to consider evolving concepts of human justice in Eighth
Amendment analysis, that of Weems v. United States. 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910). The Court in
Trop, however, elaborated significantly upon the concept of decency proposed in Weems:
[T]he death penalty has been employed throughout our history, and,
in a day when it is still widely accepted, it cannot be said to violate the
constitutional concept of cruelty. But it is equally plain that the
existence of the death penalty is not a license for the Government to
devise any punishment short of death within the limit of its
imagination. . . . The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment
is nothing less than the dignity of man. While the State has the power
to punish, the Amendment stands to assure that this power be
exercised within the limits of civilized standards. . . The Court
recognized in [Weems] that the words of the [Eighth] Amendment are
not precise, and that their scope is not static. The Amendment must
draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society.
356 U.S. at 99-101; see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 270-71 (1972) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (advocating prohibition of uncivilized and inhuman punishment which are an
affront to human dignity).
38
Kearns, supra note 5, at 214; see Neil Vidmar & Phoebe Ellsworth, Public Opinion and
the Death Penalty, 26 STAN. L. REV 1245, 1246 (1973-1974) (stating that both the concurring
and dissenting justices in Furman accepted Weems’ and Trop’s “evolving standards of
decency” as the appropriate test but disagreed about the role of public sentiment and
public opinion polls in determining those standards). When subjectively weighing
substantial shifts among state legislatures, “[i]t is not so much the number of these States
that is significant, but the consistency of the direction of change.” Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304, 315 (2003). As to international standards, some have argued that the United
States’ contemporary standards on the death penalty violate her treaty obligations. Hill v.
McDonough, 126 S. Ct. 2096 (2006) (Brief of Amicus Curiae, Human Rights Advocates,
Human Rights Watch, and Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights, in Support of
Petitioner Hill).
39
See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313 (“Thus, in cases involving a consensus, our own judgment is
‘brought to bear’ by asking whether there is reason to disagree with the judgment reached
by the citizenry and its legislators.”); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 563 (2005)
(overruling Atkins to the extent that it authorized judicial discretion only in certain cases,
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Eventually, a much narrower view of evolving societal standards of
decency was popularized by the Supreme Court case of Penry v.
Lynaugh.40 There, the Court traded out Trop’s “human dignity” and
“evolving standards of decency” for a more simplistic “contemporary
standards of decency” analysis.41 The Penry analysis avoids Trop’s
subjective factors and instead regards the aggregate legal or formal
position of all state and federal execution statutes as the sine qua non of
standards of decency.42 Roper v. Simmons, decided in 2005, has since been
the only Supreme Court decision to overtly employ the “evolving
instead stating that judicial recognition of substantial shifts is always constitutional); see
also Furman, 408 U.S. at 277, 299, 300 (Brennan, J., concurring).
40
492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989).
41
Trop, 356 U.S. at 100-01; Penry, 492 U.S. at 331. “The clearest and most reliable
objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country’s
legislatures.” Penry, 492 U.S. at 331. Penry additionally considered objectively the actions
of sentencing juries in determining whether mentally incapacitated persons could be
executed. Id. at 331. The shift from evolving to contemporary standards was likely
simultaneous with a shift in Supreme Court majorities. See Vidmar & Ellsworth, supra note
38, at 1246-47, n.14 (comparing various concurring and dissenting justices in Furman for
their views on the appropriate factors for determining standards of decency). For instance,
in his concurrence to Furman, Justice Brennan opined:
A third principle inherent in the Clause is that a severe punishment
must not be unacceptable to contemporary society. Rejection by
society, of course, is a strong indication that a severe punishment does
not comport with human dignity . . . . Legislative authorization, of
course, does not establish acceptance. The acceptability of a severe
punishment is measured, not by its availability, for it might become so
offensive to society as never to be inflicted, but by its use . . . . The
objective indicator of society’s view of an unusually severe
punishment is what society does with it, and today society will inflict
death upon only a small sample of the eligible criminals. Rejection
could hardly be more complete without becoming absolute. At the
very least, I must conclude that contemporary society views this
punishment with substantial doubt.
Furman, 408 U.S. at 277, 279, 300.
42
Penry, 492 U.S. at 331; see also Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313 (a prodigy of Penry analysis). A
recent Tennessee Supreme Court decision adhering to contemporary standards of decency
relied on three indicators that lethal injection is proper: first, that lethal injection is
“commonly thought to be the most humane form of execution;” second, that thirty-seven of
thirty-eight death penalty jurisdictions prefer lethal injection; and third, that no court has
ever held lethal injection as a method to be cruel and unusual punishment. Abdur’Rahman
v. Bredesen, 181 S.W.3d 292, 306-07 (Tenn. 2005). But see Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312 (there the
Supreme Court indicated only that Penry’s demand for “objective factors” circumscribed
broader evolving standards in proportionality review cases) (citing Rummel v. Estelle, 445
U.S. 263, 274-75 (1980)); Kearns, supra note 5, at 222 (noting that all Circuit courts have
stated this same proposition as Atkins). See generally Wheeler v. Commonwealth, 121
S.W.3d 173, 186 (Ky. 2003); Cooper v. Rimmer, 358 F.3d 655, 659 (9th Cir. 2004); State v.
Webb, 750 A.2d 448, 457-58 (Conn. 2000) (describing at length the lethal injection legislation
in thirty-four states).
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standards of decency” analysis in lieu of Penry’s “contemporary
standards of decency” analysis.43
The significance of the Trop/Penry distinction remains potent today.
After Trop, lethal injection became the preferred method of execution in
most jurisdictions.44 Lethal injection is touted as the best assurance of
humane execution,45 owing largely to its likeness to medical
procedures.46 The method also requires a great deal of technical skill;
however, states have had an increasingly difficult time enlisting medical
43
543 U.S. 551, 562-63 (2005) (stating that the Court in Atkins did not solidify whether or
not the Court’s independent judgment could be a factor in determining standards of
decency, this Court opted to return to earlier precedent, namely Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584, 592 (1977)). Coker stated: “[T]he Constitution contemplates that in the end our own
judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of the death penalty
under the Eighth Amendment.” Coker, 433 U.S. at 597 (emphasis added). Roper, being thus
far a rare exception to Penry analysis, has been chastised for its return to international law
considerations and judicial discretion in noting substantial shifts in society. Kearns, supra
note 5, at 199-200.
44
FREDERICK DRIMMER, UNTIL YOU ARE DEAD: THE BOOK OF EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA 75
n.2 (Carol Publishing Group 1990). New York’s Death Commission, in the 1880s, was the
first in any state to consider using lethal injection, though it ultimately decided to
implement electrocution instead. Id. In 1977, Oklahoma was the first state to implement
lethal injection. Id. at 75-76. Presently, thirty-seven states, the U.S. federal government,
and the U.S. military authorize capital punishment by statute. Ewart, supra note 36, at 1159,
n.2. Lethal injection is the preferred option, if not the only option, for execution in each of
these jurisdictions except Nebraska (authorizing only the electric chair). Id. at 1169-82. As
of 2001, twenty states offered, by statute, at least two constitutional methods-of-execution.
COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 18, at 80. In addition to the thirty-eight jurisdictions that
then provided for lethal injection (thirty-seven today), eleven permitted electrocution, three
permitted hanging, three permitted the firing squad, and five permitted lethal gas as
methods of execution. Id. at 91-105 (citing Jacob Weisberg, This is Your Death, in THE NEW
REPUBLIC, July 1, 1991 [hereinafter Weisberg]).
45
COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 18, at 103 (citing Weisberg, supra note 44). See, e.g.,
Workman v. Bredesen, 486 F.3d 896, 906-07 (6th Cir. 2007); Abdur’Rahman v. Bredesen, 181
S.W.3d 292, 306-07 (Tenn. 2005).
46
Ewart, supra note 36, at 1166 n.77 (citing Meghan S. Skelton, Lethal Injection in the Wake
of Fierro v. Gomez, 19 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 1, 2 (1997)). Dr. Stanley Deutch developed the
current form of lethal injection in 1977 at the Anesthesiology Department of Oklahoma
University. COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 18, at 83 (citing Weisberg, supra note 44). The
most popular lethal injection machine in use today, however, was developed by Dr. Fred
Leuchter at the behest of the New Jersey Department of Corrections to help eliminate
accidents. Id. at 104. For a detailed description of the machine, see id. at 123 (citing the
Lethal Injection Manual for the State of Missouri, Fred A. Leuchter Associates, Inc., describing
the delivery module and the manufacturer’s suggested procedure). As in medical
procedures, lethal injection protocols have accounted for some or all of the following, to
some degree: the step-by-step of the procedure to be undertaken; the qualifications,
training, and description of duties for team members; monitoring and contemporaneous
records of each step in the procedure; and guidelines for selecting, obtaining, storing, and
disposing properly of intravenous chemicals. See Workman v. Bredesen, 486 F.3d 896, 902
(6th Cir. 2007).
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practitioners’ assistance in the procedure because most consider
effectuating death by any means an ethical conflict of interest.47 With
lethal injection instead being administered by corrections officials,
whether or not lethal injection remains largely judgment-proof may well
depend on whether the courts adhere to “contemporary” or “evolving”
standards of decency.48
2.

Proportional Death Sentencing

A cruel and unusual death sentence is one “grossly
disproportionate” to the legitimate penological objectives and/or
standards of decency before a court.49 In the lethal injection era,
47
Colin Miller, A Death by Any Other Name: The Federal Government’s Inconsistent
Treatment of Drugs Used in Lethal Injections and Physician-Assisted Suicide, in 17 J. L. &
HEALTH 221, 234-35 (2002-2003). The American Medical Association (AMA) adopted
formal rules of ethics, derived in part from the Supreme Court’s decision in Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997), prohibiting physician-assisted suicide and in part from the
predominant understanding of the Hippocratic Oath—”[first], do no harm”—stating that
assisting in the performance of capital punishment would be a serious ethical breach. Id.
For instance, in California, two anesthesiologists refused to participate, citing ethical
reasons, in the execution of Michael Angelo Morales on the eve of his February, 2006
execution. Ewart, supra note 36, at 1189-90. Nevertheless, in the absence of willing licensed
physicians, the Eastern District of Virginia has simply assumed that, “for exceedingly
practical reasons,” the standard of care owed in lethal injection is reduced below that owed
in hospitals. Emmett v. Johnson, 489 F. Supp. 2d 543, 543 n.5, 553 (E.D. Va. 2007) (citing
Workman, 486 F.3d at 910). The Eleventh Circuit in Abdur’Rahman likewise held that
denying prison wardens the authority to “obtain, mix, and administer a controlled
substance . . . . would risk frustrating the Tennessee General Assembly’s considered
decision to adopt execution by lethal injection as the primary method of execution in
Tennessee.” Abdur’Rahman, 181 S.W.3d at 313, 314. Even so, that same court attempted to
attract medical technicians by guaranteeing their immunity from suit, asserting that
executions fall outside the purview of licensing statutes. Id.
48
See Miller, supra note 47, at 231-33 (reporting at least thirty-one botched executions
between the nation’s first lethal injection in 1982 and 2001). Three things are primarily to
blame for these failures: “a wide variance in the drugs and dosages used in different
states,” “that many states do not provide adequate instructions for executioners,” and
“untrained executioners,” which compounds the inadequate instructions problem. Id. at
232-33.
49
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977). Proportionality is not a simple weighing of
facts in each state. Post-Furman reforms show that states had assumed one of three
sentencing patterns: mandatory death penalty sentencing for specific crimes (no discretion
intended), aggravating or mitigating factors for the trier of fact to consider (limiting and
controlling discretion), or mandatory death penalty sentencing if certain aggravating
factors are present (a combination of the other two). William R. Taylor, Comment, Criminal
Law—Capital Punishment—The Texas Statutes Authorizing the Death Penalty Do Not Violate the
Eighth Amendment’s Prohibition of Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 7 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 170,
177 (1975-1976).
The outer bounds of unnecessary or arbitrary proportionality
determinations are by no means easy to determine. See Kearns, supra note 5, at 200. “As a
result of the Court’s 115 year refusal to hear method-of-execution cases, there is little or no
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proportionality has undergone more change than any other branch of
Eighth Amendment analysis.50 Beginning with United States v. Furman in
1967, the Supreme Court attempted to mitigate arbitrary determinations
at death penalty sentencing by implementing a temporary nationwide
moratorium on the death penalty.51 Nevertheless, Furman did not
profess to end capital punishment itself. The moratorium was lifted in
1976 when, in Gregg v. Georgia, the Court deemed three states’ death
penalty standards were no longer arbitrary or unreasonable.52 Since
1976, nearly all of the changes to Eighth Amendment precedent in
habeas proceedings have, likewise, regarded proportionality.53 To date,
Furman’s progeny have held capital punishment to be either inherently
indecent or lacking penological support—and consequently an
unconstitutional sentence—for pregnant women, the mentally insane,
juveniles, and the mentally retarded.54

illustrative precedent to facilitate meaningful understanding of what constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment.” Id.
50
See, e.g., Kearns, supra note 5, at 206-07. “[A]fter the progressive standards of Trop
were announced, the Court seemingly turned its back on method-of-execution analysis,
instead chipping away (sic) at death-eligible offenses and demographic eligibility for the
death penalty.” Id.
51
408 U.S. 238 (1972). Furman stated, specifically, that pregnant women could not
rightly be executed under Trop’s standards of decency indicia or in furtherance of
penological objectives. Id. at 239-40. The effect of Furman, cumulatively, was to nullify
each of the thirty-two state death penalty statutes that existed at the time and retroactively
free every inmate who was sentenced under those statutes from the threat of execution.
DRIMMER, supra note 44, at 76. As shocking an effect as it was, it was not necessarily a
surprise. Id. “Actually, there had been an unofficial moratorium on executions since 1967
as one legal challenge after another to the death sentence moved through the courts.” Id.;
see also Miller, supra note 47, at 225-26 (on ending the capital punishment moratorium).
52
428 U.S. 153, 207 (1976). “No longer can a jury wantonly and freakishly impose the
death sentence; it is always circumscribed by the legislative guidelines.” Id. at 206-07. The
moratorium, a de facto state of affairs since the late 1960s, had formalized primarily to allow
study into and improvements on state and federal capital punishment statutes, rules, and
regulations. Furman, 408 U.S. at 305, 436 n.18. Thereafter, in Gregg, and in companion
cases, the Georgia, Texas, and Florida state death penalty statutes and regulations were
deemed adequately revised to protect against arbitrary jury discretion in death sentencing.
BRANDON, supra note 22, at 244. See also Taylor, supra note 49, at 171. “Furman thus was
viewed [by the Texas Criminal Court of Appeals in Jurek v. State, 522 S.W.2d 934, 938 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1975)] as doing no more than condemning the arbitrary, capricious, and
standardless manner in which juries had been allowed to impose the death penalty.” Id.
53
CARTER & KREITZBERG, supra note 31, at 21. See supra note 50; infra note 54.
54
Furman, 408 U.S. at 238 (pregnant women); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986)
(mentally insane); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (mentally retarded); Roper, 543 U.S. at 578
(juveniles). Although Atkins supported Penry’s contemporary standards of decency
analysis, it departed on proportionality grounds from Penry’s previous affirmation of the
death penalty for less-severely mentally retarded persons. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,
321 (2003); Penry, 492 U.S. at 340.
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Legitimate Penological Objectives

Aside from inherent indecency or gross disproportionality, a
punishment may be unconstitutionally cruel and unusual if it fails to
advance materially a legitimate penological objective.55 The Supreme
Court illustrated in Coker that any punishment which fails to meet this
threshold is “nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition
of pain and suffering.”56 The Supreme Court has required state
governments to show relevant penological interests when instituting
capital punishment since the birth of method-of-execution analysis in
Wilkerson v. Utah and In re Kemmler.57 Currently, courts accept
penological objectives for the death penalty and the justifications for the
punishment in its entirety, especially retribution and deterrence.58 This
is because, under habeas corpus, death row prisoners’ only postconviction relief was an equitable stay of execution rather than an
injunction against specific conditions of confinement.59 Since even one
stay of execution would erode the states’ retributive and deterrence

55
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (addressing, in particular, how the original
trier of fact had been given almost standardless discretion to find a convicted rapist of
adult women worthy of the death sentence). See supra notes 20, 25 and accompanying text
(offering definitions and scope for legitimate penological objectives); see also CARTER &
KREITZBERG, supra note 31, at 29 (indicating that some have donned the category of
punishments which fail for wont of legitimate penological objectives “punishments
unauthorized by law.”). See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 2, at 360 n.12 (illustrating how, by this
Coker criterion, torture is inherently indecent).
56
Coker, 433 U.S. at 592. Actually, Gregg was the first case to elaborate on Justice
Powell’s dissenting plug for “the ends of penology” in Furman. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 182-83
(citing Furman, 408 U.S. at 451). “[T]he sanction imposed cannot be so totally without
penological justification that it results in the gratuitous infliction of suffering.” Id. at 183.
57
99 U.S. 130 (1879); 136 U.S. 436 (1890). “The infliction of capital punishment is itself a
deliberate act, deliberately administered for a penal purpose.” Taylor v. Crawford, 487
F.3d 1072, 1081 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 300 (1991)). See supra
note 20.
58
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183; CARTER & KREITZBERG, supra note 31, at 32.
59
See Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 643, 647 (2004).
Despite its literal applicability . . . § 1983 must yield to the more
specific habeas statute . . . where an inmate seeks injunctive relief
challenging the fact of his conviction or the duration of his
sentence. . . . By contrast, constitutional claims that merely challenge
the conditions of a prisoner’s confinement, whether the inmate seeks
monetary or injunctive relief, fall outside of that core and may be
brought pursuant to § 1983 in the first instance. . . . If a request for a
permanent injunction does not sound in habeas, it follows that the
lesser-included request for a temporary stay (or preliminary
injunction) does not either.
Id. at 643, 647; see supra note 31 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 111-12
(discussing the factors for determining whether injunctive stay is appropriate).
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justifications for death sentencing, courts have jealously guarded
legislatures’ penological interests by lending them massive deference in
method-of-execution analysis.60
Retribution is perhaps the most compelling and longstanding
penological justification for affirming death penalty sentences and
among the oldest qualities distinguishing governance from
statelessness.61 Retribution is the ideological principle that governments
deserve to resort to capital punishment because society has authorized
criminal justice as the means of restoring moral balance.62 Entrusting

60
See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 186-87 (1976) (noting that federalism and respect
for the abilities of legislatures are sufficient reasons for due deference to them). See, e.g.,
Hill v. McDonough, 2006 WL 2556938 *2-4 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 1, 2006); Workman v. Bredesen,
486 F.3d 896, 904-10 (6th Cir. 2007); Emmett v. Johnson, 489 F. Supp. 2d 543, 550-55 (E.D.
Va. 2007).
61
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183, n.30. See, e.g., M.R. Gardner, Executions and Indignities—an
Eighth Amendment Assessment of Methods of Inflicting Capital Punishment, 39 OHIO ST. L.J. 96,
113-18 (1978) (discussing deterrence, retribution, and moral outrage as a part of
retribution); COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 18, at 31 (offering an overview of the death
penalty interest in retribution); CARTER & KREITZBERG, supra note 31, at 8, 24 (assuming
categorization of retribution and deterrence as penological interests without comment).
The Court in Gregg called retribution and deterrence “two principal social purposes” of the
death penalty. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183. Some death penalty advocates believe retribution is
the most important justification for capital punishment:
I would favor retention of the death penalty as retribution even if it
were shown that the threat of execution could not deter prospective
murderers not already deterred by the threat of imprisonment. . . . At
any rate, the actual monetary costs are trumped by the importance of
doing justice. . . . Retribution is an independent moral justification.
COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra, at 16, 17 (quoting Ernest van den Haag, The Ultimate
Punishment: A Defense, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1662, 1665-66 (1986) [hereinafter van den Haag]).
See generally Domino & Boccaccin, supra note 3 (explaining when and how public execution
gave way to private execution). But see Ewart, supra note 36, at 1162. Retribution interest
was partially abandoned when the public began to prefer rehabilitation to punishment in
the early 1800s. Id. The focus on rehabilitation began a movement to create other statecustody endeavors: penitentiaries, asylums, and the like. Id. Notwithstanding its erosion,
the Supreme Court has noted that, while retribution may not be the “dominant objective”
of criminal law anymore, it has still been upheld as consistent with “respect for the dignity
of” all people. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183 (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248
(1949)).
62
JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 16 (Lexis 2001). “Retributivists
believe that punishment is justified when it is deserved. It is deserved when the
wrongdoer freely chooses to violate society’s rules.” Id. This is the theory of so-called “just
desserts,” which originated in part from Old Testament references to the “eye for an eye”
principal, philosophers like Immanuel Kant, and the Biblical concept of lex talionis. CARTER
& KREITZBERG, supra note 31, at 11, nn.20-23. But see Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 30405 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (critiquing retribution of right and describing society’s
greater desire for deterrence):
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government agents with the death penalty task has at least two
benefits.63 First, capital punishment is how civilized societies attempt to
dole out vengeance in lieu of personal vendettas and mob justice.64 The
public at large, in particular the family and friends of an offender’s
victims, would likely lack the ability or desire to dispassionately, if
humanely, perform executions.65 Second, capital punishment also grants
death row inmates a measure of mercy which mob justice would not.66
The only other purpose suggested, one that is independent of
protection for society, is retribution. Shortly stated, retribution in this
context means that criminals are put to death because they deserve
it . . . . The claim must be that for capital crimes death alone comports
with society’s notion of proper punishment. . . . The asserted public
belief that murderers and rapists deserve to die is flatly inconsistent
with the execution of a random few. As the history of the punishment
of death in this country shows, our society wishes to prevent crime; we
have no desire to kill criminals simply to get even with them.
Id.; see id. at 303 (explaining how societies manifest moral outrage toward crime and how
he believes imprisonment can serve the purpose as effectively as capital punishment).
63
Furman, 408 U.S. at 308 (Stewart, J., concurring) (also cited in Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183,
n.29):
The instinct for retribution is part of the nature of man, and channeling
that instinct in the administration of criminal justice serves an
important purpose in promoting the stability of a society governed by
law. When people begin to believe that organized society is unwilling
or unable to impose upon criminal offenders the punishment they
“deserve,” then there are sown the seeds of anarchy—of self-help,
vigilante justice, and lynch law.
Id.; see also COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 18, at 28 (recounting a story from RIDEAU &
WIKBERG, LIFE SENTENCES: RAGE AND SURVIVAL BEHIND BARS 306-07 (1992) in which, when
an executioner failed to properly decapitate a woman and gave up in desperation, the
angry crowd responded by brutally killing him).
64
Compare Furman, 408 U.S. at 308, with Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555,
571 (1980). The Supreme Court in Richmond Newspapers justified a public right of open
access to trials as a prophylactic measure against “vengeful ‘self-help’” and as an outlet for
societal retribution and closure, much the same reasoning which goes into death penalty
retribution. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 571.
65
Domino & Boccaccin, supra note 3, at 73-74 (stating that the motivation of family and
friends of victims to watch a killer’s death may be “revengeful fantasy,” a desire for closure
and psychological betterment, a sense of justice and safety in the world, or any
combination thereof). For these reasons, families of murder victims have largely led the
legal movement to permit themselves and others like them access to witness executions. Id.
at 73.
66
See Vidmar & Ellsworth, supra note 38, at 1264-66 (section titled “Levels of Death
Penalty Attitudes”). “[S]ome people may favor the idea of capital punishment without
realizing or without accepting its implications.” Id. Another camp, advocates of maximum
pain, would intentionally implement retribution without pity or dignity in executions, in
part to make the gruesomeness of the death penalty enterprise, and not merely the
likelihood of death sentences, a deterrent of violent crimes. See Gardner, supra note 61, at
117. They would add that the death penalty ought to be excruciating, if not humiliating as
well, for the convict and that, as the likelihood of severe punishment is relaxed, deterrence

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2008

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 42, No. 3 [2008], Art. 6

972

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

Along these same lines, condemned criminals are enabled to seek postconviction relief, wherein courts attempt to enforce method-of-execution
constitutional limits on the behavior of government agents.67
Deterrence is, like retribution, a paramount penological objective for
the death penalty.68 In theory, deterrence dissuades people from
committing crimes punishable by death by instilling fear of execution
where otherwise stiff fines or life imprisonment would be the harshest
punishments under law.69 This “intimidation” aspect of deterrence is
intended to affect every segment of society, except for condemned
criminals themselves, whom the state has manifestly chosen not to
rehabilitate.70 Aside from its conceded inapplicability to death row
loses its value. Id. Fledgling deterrence of the public could be attributed in part to
increased legal avenues for prisoners, frequently permitted stays of execution, a dramatic
increase in commutation of death sentences by state governors, and juries’ reluctant use of
the death penalty, each of which cause most people to forget the connection between the
crime and punishment. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 277, 279, 300 (Brennan, J., concurring);
COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 18, at 25-26. In 1984, the chance of a murderer receiving
capital punishment was about 1 in 1000. COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra, at 26. This all, of
course, incorrectly presupposes that the criminal element, those prone to intentional or
cold-blooded crimes, are in close proximity as witnesses to be personally affected by capital
punishment. Id. Additionally, deterrence is based on a rational connection between
choices and consequences, whereas evidence suggests that many violent offenders are
irrational, believing they cannot be caught or perceiving no connection between crime and
punishment. Id. Factors such as these can make the infliction of the sentence so hit-or-miss
that even violent offenders cannot help but be optimistic about their chances of survival.
Id. See infra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
67
See, e.g., Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749 (2004) (stating that both petition for habeas
corpus and Section 1983 actions are avenues available to imprisonment-related
complaints).
68
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (deterrence noted as one of “two principal
social purposes” of the death penalty). But see Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 300-03
(1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (finding that no evidence other than the purported
“common human experience” shows that capital punishment is any more of a deterrent
than imprisonment to the criminal himself or to others).
69
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 185-87 (acknowledging that valuation of deterrence is complex, the
Court deferred to the legislature, because they are in the better position to study its
penological value). To the degree deterrence is plausible, its effectiveness is allegedly not
minimized by repeated failures in (electrocution) executions, since or as long as such
failures are too random to be predicted. Second Electrocution Attempt, supra note 25, at 349.
“Sparing the lives of even a few prospective victims by deterring their murderers is more
important than preserving the lives of convicted murderers because of the possibility, or
even the probability, that executing them would not deter others.” COYNE & ENTZEROTH,
supra note 18, at 16 (quoting van den Haag, supra note 61, at 1662).
70
CARTER & KREITZBERG, supra note 31, at 10 (describing intimidation and arguing that
deterrence aimed at the particular offender is called “specific deterrence”). Some have
argued that execution specifically deters prisoners by incapacitation. Id. That is, death
guarantees that that one person will never commit a crime again. Id. E.g., Ernest van den
Haag, The Ultimate Punishment: A Defense, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1662 (1986). “The death penalty
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inmates, capital punishment’s effectiveness as a deterrent of others
remains a significant source of academic debate.71 At the very least,
deterrence varies according to the sentiments of decency in and among
public sectors.72
In order to venerate the aims of retribution and deterrence, in 1996
Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(“AEDPA”) to eliminate undue delays between capital sentencing and
punishment.73 With rare exception, the AEDPA prevents death row
is our harshest punishment. It is irrevocable: it ends the existence of those punished,
instead of temporarily imprisoning them.” Id. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has
never ranked specific deterrence as a penological interest alongside the other aims of
deterrence. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183 n.28; see also CARTER & KREITZBERG, supra, at 11.
71
E.g., Gregg, 428 U.S. at 184-85; see infra note 72.
72
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 185. According to a 1996 survey of academic criminological society
presidents in this country, 84% believe the death penalty is ineffective as a deterrent to
murder.
Facts about the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER,
September 27, 2006, www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/factsheet.pdf (last visited October 2, 2007)
[hereinafter DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER]. The evidence suggests that most
people with calloused and violent predispositions, who may eventually become capital
punishment’s best candidates, are not measurably deterred even in jurisdictions where
violent offenders are repeatedly sentenced to death. Id.; COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note
18, at 26. “We may nevertheless assume safely there are murderers, such as those who act
in passion, for whom the threat of death has little or no deterrent effect. But for many
others, the death penalty undoubtedly, is a significant deterrent.” Id. Common use of the
death penalty has in fact been tied to increased violence and brutalization among the
public. COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra, at 26-28 (citing, in part, Raymond Bonner & Ford
Fessenden, States With No Death Penalty Share Lower Homicide Rates, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22,
2000, at A1) (noting, among other things, a negative correlation between capital
punishment and murder rates in ten out of twelve non-death penalty states when
compared to the national per-capita rates). Likewise, a 2004 FBI Uniform Crime Report
explained that where capital punishment is used without the least hesitation, particularly
in the South, the murder rate nonetheless remains the highest, whereas the opposite is true,
on both accounts, as to the Northeast. Facts about the Death Penalty, supra.
73
The AEDPA provides, in relevant part, the following:
(b) A stay of execution granted pursuant to subsection (a) shall expire
if—
(1) a State prisoner fails to file a habeas corpus application
under section 2254 within the time required in section 2263;
(2) before a court of competent jurisdiction, in the presence
of counsel, unless the prisoner has competently and
knowingly waived such counsel, and after having been
advised of the consequences, a State prisoner under capital
sentence waives the right to pursue habeas corpus review
under section 2254; or
(3) a State prisoner files a habeas corpus petition under
section 2254 within the time required by section 2263 and
fails to make a substantial showing of the denial of a Federal
right or is denied relief in the district court or any
subsequent stage of review
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inmates from utilizing more than one successive habeas corpus challenge
to the validity or duration of their death sentences.74 Congress’ specific
intent for the AEDPA was to thwart eleventh hour appeals for stay of
execution by inmates on the eve of their executions.75
C. Section 1983 and its Capital Punishment Applicability
Only recently has Section 1983 jurisprudence crossed paths with
habeas corpus jurisprudence.76 This section explores how the legitimate
penological interests requirement in death penalty cases generally has
manifested in Section 1983 civil rights cases. That exploration in turn
brings into focus the facts and laws surrounding present-day death row
conditions of confinement cases which confront the courts.
Although Section 1983 provides no affirmative substantive rights, a
qualified Section 1983 claimant can use this cause of action to enforce
various substantive rights guarantees that were allegedly deprived
under “color” of law.77 Shortly after its enactment following the Civil
(c) If one of the conditions in subsection (b) has occurred, no Federal
court thereafter shall have the authority to enter a stay of execution in
the case, unless the court of appeals approves the filing of a second or
successive application under section 2244(b).
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2262(b)-(c) (2000).
Habeas limitations found in the AEDPA operate similarly to claim preclusion: if the judicial
review requested goes to the merits of something previously not discussed on its merits,
there is no second and subsequent habeas petition problem which would invoke the Act, in
which case an inmate may proceed on alternative Section 1983 claims as well. Id. See
generally Green v. White, 223 F.3d 1001 (9th Cir. 2000).
74
28 U.S.C. § 2262(b); see also Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750-51 (2004)
(describing how an implicit or hybrid habeas claim requires an inmate to exhaust state or
federal channels before being permitted to bring a federal court habeas action, pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A)).
75
Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 649 (2004). A common law rule, not specifically
from the AEDPA, states that “[e]quity must take into consideration the State’s strong
interest in proceeding with its judgment and . . . attempt[s] at manipulation.” Id. There is a
strong equitable presumption against a stay of execution where the inmate appears to have
needlessly delayed bringing his Section 1983 claim. Id. at 650.
76
Muhammad v. Close was the first case to apply Section 1983 and habeas corpus jointly
while also maintaining their distinctiveness. 540 U.S. 749 (2004). See infra notes 99-102 and
accompanying text.
77
See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). A prima facie case for civil rights violations under Section
1983 requires: (1) a natural person as petitioner; (2) a deprivation of federal constitutional
or statutory rights; and (3) that said deprivation was caused by a defendant acting “[u]nder
[c]olor of [s]tate [l]aw.” ROSALIE BERGER LEVINSON & IVAN E. BODENSTEINER, CIVIL RIGHTS
LEGISLATION AND LITIGATION, II-43 (2006); see also Crawford v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574 (1998)
(rejecting a heightened pleading requirement of culpability or intent in Section 1983
actions, saying that such a requirement depends on the underlying substantive right being
alleged). For an in-depth treatment of Section 1983’s Eighth Amendment precedent, see
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War, Section 1983 was relegated to virtual disuse for almost a century,
having been successfully alleged prior to Monroe v. Pape in 1961 on only
twenty-one occasions in all the nation’s courts combined.78 In contrast,
Section 1983 litigation is presently common fare for allegations of abuse
of federal law by the federal government, municipalities, and public
officials—a turnaround owing largely to increased vindication of Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection rights on
which Section 1983’s legislative history is based.79
1.

Practices Leading to Death Row Inmates’ Section 1983 Eighth
Amendment Claims

In the rights-restrictive context of prisons and execution chambers,
Eighth Amendment Section 1983 cases have, for the most part,
recognized the same penological objectives criteria as the Supreme Court
set forth in the First Amendment conditions of confinement case Pell v.
Procunier.80 Pell stated that inmates retain whatever rights are not
inconsistent with their status as prisoners or with legitimate penological
objectives.81 Accordingly, there are just three legitimate penological
generally IVAN E. BODENSTEINER & ROSALIE BERGER LEVINSON, STATE & LOCAL
GOVERNMENT CIVIL RIGHTS LIABILITY, § 1.13 (1987).
78
365 U.S. 167 (1961); LEVINSON & BODENSTEINER, supra note 77, at II-43; Comment, The
Civil Rights Act: Emergence of an Adequate Federal Civil Remedy?, 26 IND. L.J. 361, 363 (1951).
79
LEVINSON & BODENSTEINER, supra note 77, at II-43. Section 1983 is part of the
“Reconstruction [Legislation],” 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-86, though it originated in the Ku Klux
Klan Act of 1871. Id. Given its origin in Fourteenth Amendment rights and the explicit
legislative intent to attack civil rights violations under color of law, it has long been clear
that Section 1983 is a valid abrogation of states’ Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity,
if only for provisions enacted pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. E.g.,
Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
80
417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974).
81
Id. For example, a prisoner always retains the First Amendment right to communicate
about conditions of confinement (or any other matter), absent a narrowly tailored
compelling concern for content-neutral regulation, and even then a convict must have
adequate alternative means of communicating with a reasonable audience of his or her
choice. Id. at 825-26. Aside from the fact that the government may not practice
discrimination against the public based on viewpoint, if it makes public access available
into a correctional environment, admittance is within the professional discretion of the
Department of Corrections, which may invite specific members of the public only if doing
so would be in the best interests of prisoner rehabilitation (that is, the prisoner’s best
interests and correctional system’s best interests). Id. at 823, 825. This demonstrates that, in
most ways, correctional facilities are necessarily more rights-restrictive than courtrooms,
for both the public and convicts themselves. E.g., id. at 826 (permitting reasonable time,
place, and manner restrictions limiting access and communication insofar as necessary to
further significant government interests). In Pell, California’s Department of Corrections
Manual Section 415.071 denied the press interviews with individual inmates. Id. at 820.
The rule came in reaction to major disciplinary problems which resulted when various
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objectives recognized in conditions of confinement sufficient to warrant
legislative deference: the deterrence of crime, rehabilitation of prisoners,
and internal security within correctional facilities.82
Even so, to effectuate the penological goals of capital punishment,
most states authorize executions by only succinct statutes and grant their
Departments of Correction broad discretion to handle the bulk of
implementation.83 The typical state death penalty statute provides the
inmates started gaining media attention. Id. at 821. Thus, the Court accepted that those
deemed best able to aid in prisoner rehabilitation included clergy, family, or legal counsel,
but not, for instance, criminal co-conspirators. Id. at 827. Likewise, the Court in Houchins v.
KQED announced that the right to gather news within jails by way of audio tape or video
recordings can be denied because it would constitute “an implied special right of access to
government-controlled sources of information.” 438 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1978) (explaining that the
“government-controlled sources of information” referred to are not prisoners, but rather
the prison facilities). Said the Court:
The media are not a substitute for or an adjunct of government and,
like the courts, they are “ill-equipped” to deal with problems of prison
administration. . . . The public importance of conditions in penal
facilities and the media’s role of providing information afford no basis
for reading into the Constitution a right of the public or the media to
enter these institutions, with camera equipment, and take moving and
still pictures of inmates for broadcast purposes.
Id. at 9. But see Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 597-98 (1980) (describing a
presumption of openness for the public and press at trials).
82
Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974) (analyzing only these three interests as the
possible “legitimate policies and goals of the corrections system”). See Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 352 (1981) (indicating that in an Eighth Amendment case, “the
goals” of “the penal function,” as distinct from other functions of the criminal system, are:
retribution (“to punish justly”), deterrence (“to deter future crime”), and rehabilitation (“to
return imprisoned persons to society with an improved change of being useful, lawabiding citizens”)). Safety or security has, under First Amendment precedent in Section
1983, been considered a legitimate penological objective, insofar as it places conditions on
inmates’ confinement which advance the goal of internal safety within prison facilities.
Pell, 417 U.S. at 823. A recent Eighth Amendment derivative of the interest in prison
institutional safety is execution chamber security, for the benefit of the execution team. See
Workman v. Bredesen, 486 F.3d 896, 909-10 (6th Cir. 2007) (discussing certain protocols in
the execution chamber in furtherance of a legitimate penological interest in security and
safety). Security is paramount in the execution chamber, since a violent criminal might
recklessly pursue whatever remaining opportunities for self-preservation are left before he
is scheduled to die. Id. Another, broader correlation is deterrence as protection for society
and crime prevention in the aggregate. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 304-05 (1972)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (discussing societal safety).
83
E.g., IND. CODE. 35-38-6-1 (2006) “Execution of death sentence; specified time and date;
executioner”:
(a) The punishment of death shall be inflicted by intravenous injection
of a lethal substance or substances into the convicted person:
(1) in a quantity sufficient to cause the death of the convicted
person; and
(2) until the convicted person is dead.
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common name of the preferred procedure to be used, lethal injection or
electrocution for instance, followed by an alternate method that can be
chosen at the prisoner’s timely election or if the preferred method is held
unconstitutional.84
Next, most death penalty statutes offer basic
guidelines as to what type of lethal injection chemicals (or electric
current) should be used to execute a person.85 Finally, these statutes
generally give state prison officials the direction to “kill them until
they’re dead” so to speak.86 Beyond these basic guidelines, legislatures
(b) The death penalty shall be inflicted before the hour of sunrise on a
date fixed by the sentencing court. However, the execution must not
occur until at least one hundred (100) days after the conviction.
(c) The superintendent of the state prison, or persons designated by the
superintendent, shall designate the person who is to serve as the
executioner.
(d) The department of correction may adopt rules under IC 4-22-2 necessary
to implement subsection (a).
Id. (emphasis added). See Ewart, supra note 36, at 1168-82 (offering a detailed state-by-state
comparison of lethal injection policies and procedures). States and arms of state, including
legislatures and correctional agencies, are themselves immune from Section 1983 action,
because they have neither abrogated Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity nor are
they “persons” within that word’s usual meaning as required in Section 1983. Pennhurst
State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98 (1984). However, if a government
official violates federal law, the state action he performed is void and open to a damages
action against this arm of the state. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 160 (1908). Section 1983
also disallows suit against legislators or agency administrators for actions while in their
law-making capacities, though suit against administrative officials is otherwise generally
not barred by absolute or qualified immunity. In particular, Edelman v. Jordan held that
when a plaintiff sues a state official alleging a violation of federal law, the federal court
may award an injunction that governs the official’s future conduct, but not one that awards
retroactive monetary relief. 415 U.S. 651, 666-67 (1974). See infra note 90 (discussing
liability for random and unauthorized Section 1983 violations).
84
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 4209 (Lexis 2006) (“Punishment of death shall, in all
cases, be inflicted by intravenous injection . . . . If the execution of the sentence of death as
provided above is held unconstitutional . . . then punishment of death shall, in all cases, be
inflicted by hanging by the neck.”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 3604(b) (West 2006) (“Persons
sentenced to death prior to or after the operative date of this subdivision shall have the
opportunity to elect to have the punishment imposed by lethal gas or lethal injection.”). See
supra note 44 (numbering the jurisdictions that currently employ each method of
execution).
85
E.g., Murder; Sentence to Death; Administration of Punishment, N.J.S.A. 2C:49-2
(2006). The New Jersey execution statute calls for “a lethal quantity of an ultrashort-acting
barbiturate in a combination with a chemical paralytic agent in a quantity sufficient to
cause death.” Id.
86
E.g., id. (requiring that “punishment shall be imposed by continuous, intravenous
administration until the person is dead”). But see Gordon, supra note 2, at 363 (describing
how statutes which authorize lethal injection without clarifying the substances, doses, or
procedures to be used could be deemed “unconstitutionally vague,” though no court has
done so). Another possible debacle awaits states that attempt more than one successive
attempt at execution. Because most statutes merely authorize a sufficient and continuous
electrical current or chemical dosage to render death, if additional execution attempts are
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have tended not to enact any ancillary statute or authorize any rule or
regulation to advise or assess specific capital punishment-related
departmental practices.87
Departments of Correction keep execution protocols quite
confidential.88 Most states, by statute, exempt death penalty protocols
from publication as “rules” or “regulations” in the administrative code,
making it difficult for death row inmates, scholars, the press, or other
interested third parties to obtain a detailed description of chosen
execution procedures.89 Even without access to documentation about
not authorized by statute, they may be cruel and unusual punishments. Second
Electrocution Attempt, supra note 25, at 349 (citing LA. CODE CRIM. LAW & PROC. art. 569
(Dart 1943)).
87
See, e.g., Abdur’Rahman v. Bredesen, 181 S.W.3d 292, 307 (Tenn. 2005) (citing the fact
that each jurisdiction’s lethal injection methods are of the same origin and have withstood
constitutional scrutiny as proof that nothing in them needs to be altered). But see Workman
v. Bredesen, 486 F.3d 896, 899 (6th Cir. 2007) (describing Tennessee’s extraordinary efforts
in 2007 to review and improve upon lethal injection procedures “[n]otwithstanding the
decision of the Tennessee Supreme Court in 2005 and the decision of this court
[Abdur’Rahman] in 2006”). See also Morales v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972, 979-80 (N.D. Cal.
2006) (ordering the state of California execution procedures to be improved to minimize
the risk of cruel and unusual punishment). Morales was one of the first instances where a
court elaborately chided the state for deficiencies in lethal injection protocols. Id.
Particularly, cited problems by District Court Judge Fogel were:
1.
Inconsistent and unreliable screening of execution team
members . . . . 2. A lack of meaningful training, supervision, and
oversight of the execution team . . . . 3. Inconsistent and unreliable
record-keeping . . . .
4. Improper mixing, preparation, and
administration of sodium thiopental by the execution team . . . . 5.
Inadequate lighting, overcrowded conditions, and poorly designed
facilities in which the execution team must work
Id. at 979-80 (emphasis omitted).
88
The controlling Florida statute authorizing lethal injection (Fla. Stat. § 922.105(1)
(2003)) does not specify its lethal injection procedures. Hill v. McDonough, 126 S. Ct. 2096,
2100 (2006). Rather, the state Department of Corrections (“DOC”) is charged with
implementation. Id.; Sims v. State, 754 So. 2d 657, 670 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam). Despite their
duties, the Florida DOC had not, at the time of the Hill case, proffered rules for specific
protocol and had even exempted implementation policies and procedures from Florida’s
Administrative Procedures Act. Hill, 126 S. Ct. at 2100. See Fla. Stat. § 922.105(7).
According to the district court in Hill, on remand, however, Florida’s full protocol had
incidentally come to light and was available for review, though through no help of the
DOC, due to a full evidentiary hearing that had taken place on the record in Sims v. State a
few years earlier. Hill v. McDonough, 2006 WL 2556938 *3 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 1, 2006) (citing
Sims, 754 So. 2d at 657). See also Cooey v. Strickland, 479 F.3d 412, 417, 424 (6th Cir. 2007)
(inmate’s claim not timely due to his ample time to know or have reason to know the facts
and protocol which gave rise to his specific method-of-execution challenge).
89
E.g., Abdur’Rahman, 181 S.W.3d at 312. The Tennessee Supreme Court afforded great
legislative deference to the discretion of its state’s department of corrections, concluding
that “promulgation requirements of public notice, public hearing, attorney general
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lethal injection protocol, many death row inmates have nonetheless
raised Section 1983 challenges on Eighth Amendment grounds,
implicating a variety of alleged procedural deficiencies in the
correctional system as cruel and unusual conditions of confinement.90
They contend, largely, that corrections officers who act as executioners
are unintelligibly chosen, personally inexperienced, and otherwise
poorly trained to avoid inflicting unconstitutional cruel and unusual
punishment during the lethal injection procedure.91 For instance, in
Abdur’Rahman v. Bredesen, an inmate on Tennessee’s death row learned
that the state’s execution protocol was not standardized, but rather
existed only in how-to manuals, handwritten and updated by a few
correctional officials.92
To be sure, several states have gleaned from one another a practice
of regularly-scheduled mock-up training for executioners. Some states
have or will significantly revamp their procedures in reaction to Section
1983 challenges, but a lack of official standards for execution behavior
means that, despite their common origins, not all jurisdictions’ lethal
injection protocols are created equally.93 Some state protocols have
approval, and filing with the state are simply not realistic requirements for implementing
procedures that concern the intricacies and complexities of a prison environment.” Id. See
supra note 88; infra notes 194-96, 198, 200-01 (discussing difficulties in obtaining access to
lethal injection protocols).
90
E.g., Abdur’Rahman, 181 S.W.3d at 312; Hill, 126 S. Ct. at 2096; Nelson v. Campbell, 541
U.S. 637, 643 (2004); Reid v. Johnson, 333 F. Supp. 2d 543 (E.D. Va. 2004); Morales, 465 F.
Supp. 2d 972; Taylor v. Crawford, 2006 WL 1779035 (W.D. Mo. June 26, 2006); Emmett v.
Johnson, 489 F. Supp. 2d 543, 546-47 (E.D. Va. 2007). In Section 1983 litigation, a claimant
may challenge statutes or established state procedures subject to the Matthews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), balancing test, weighing the risk and severity of private
deprivation against the government interest and lack of alternatives. Zinermon v. Burch,
494 U.S. 113 (1990). Section 1983 litigation also allows challenges to recurring violations
that are not random and unauthorized, since such practices are the de facto policy and
custom of prisons, using the Matthews test. Id. at 115 n.1; Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.,
455 U.S. 422 (1982). Challenges to random and unauthorized violations by government
officials, however, must be addressed on procedural due process grounds, not Section 1983
bases. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981). See 42 U.S.C. § 1983, supra note 7. But see
Burch, 494 U.S. at 138-39. See supra note 83 (describing governmental immunity and its
limits under Section 1983).
91
E.g., Hill, 126 S. Ct. at 2096; Abdur’Rahman, 181 S.W.3d at 292; Morales, 465 F. Supp. 2d.
at 979-80.
92
181 S.W.3d 292, 312 (Tenn. 2005). John Gibeaut, It’s All in the Execution: Prosecutors
Fear Limitless Civil Rights Complaints over Lethal Injection Procedures, A.B.A. J. 17-18 (Aug.
2006) (noting that, from the defense attorney’s perspective in the Abdur’Rahman case, these
manuals are merely handwritten and amended by notes and corrections in the margins).
93
E.g. Howard Witt, Pain of Execution Debated, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 21, 2004, at 8, available at
2004 WLNR 19892328 (citing David Dow, University of Houston Law School, as saying that
lethal injection protocols have been largely unchanged and unscrutinized since first used
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and copied among the states following the model used in Texas in 1982). See, e.g., Morales
v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972, 979-80 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (citing “walk-through[]” training at
California’s San Quentin facility). See Miller, supra note 47, at 231-32 (noting a variety of
problems which some states possess and others may not); Morales, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 97980; supra note 92 (discussing adjudged problems with California’s protocol). The
evidentiary basis for states’ confidence in their lethal injection protocols can be very slight.
See, e.g., Abdur’Rahman v. Bredesen, 181 S.W.3d 292, 306 (Tenn. 2005).
There was no evidence in the record that the procedures followed
under the lethal injection protocol have resulted in the problems feared
by the petitioner; indeed the undisputed evidence was that the sole
lethal injection carried out in Tennessee, i.e., Robert Coe in 2000, had
revealed “no significant difficulties with the process.”
Id. (emphasis added); see also id. at 310-11. But see Workman v. Bredesen, 486 F.3d 896, 899
(6th Cir. 2007); supra note 82 (explaining in detail the lethal injection improvements in
Tennessee); Morales, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 979-80 (ordering various death penalty
improvements); Morales v. Hickman, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1047-48 (N.D. Cal. 2006)
(ordering the state to make one of two improvements in a timely manner to avoid a stay of
execution: (1) specify that “only sodium thiopental or another barbiturate or combination
of barbiturates” will be used in execution; or (2) agree to independently guarantee, by the
direct observation of qualified personnel, that the inmate is indeed unconscious before the
second and third chemicals are injected and this “in a manner comparable to that normally
used in medical settings where a combination of sedative and paralytic medications is
administered”).
In California, as most other states, a qualified person must be formally trained and
experienced in general anesthesia, though that may include correctional employees. Id. at
1048. The identity of that person may be kept confidential in documentation and by the
clothes they wear during execution. Id. Like California, a North Carolina court has held
that an execution requires not only trained personnel to proceed but that they must also be
“present and accessible to Plaintiff throughout the execution” to guarantee that the inmate
is “in all respects unconscious prior to and at the time of the administration of any
pancuronium bromide or potassium chloride.” Brown v. Beck, 2006 WL 3914717 *8
(E.D.N.C. Apr. 7, 2006). Their role is to immediately return the inmate to unconsciousness
if he ever “exhibit[s] effects of consciousness.” Id.
Other states place security above prisoner safety in the chamber. Because prisoners
can be expected to attempt to escape execution by whatever means necessary in the last
moments of their lives, these states purposefully “deviate from the surgical norm of
physical proximity” and allow execution personnel to be farther away from the condemned
and the lethal chemical syringes for their own safety. Workman, 486 F.3d at 909-10. This is
the situation particularly in states which view execution procedures as requiring a lower
standard of care than generally expected of medical practice. See Emmett, 489 F. Supp. 2d at
543. To compensate for the executioners’ conceded inability to monitor Pentothal intake,
Tennessee protocol, at least, now calls for there to be a television monitor in the execution
chamber and a camera above the gurney where the inmate lies, for the executioner’s remote
viewing. As an added measure, in Tennessee, the warden remains in the chamber and
stands within a foot of the top of the gurney, having been trained to detect problems like
crimped IV lines or failure of the injection to go into the inmate’s vein. Id. In Missouri, by
contrast, non-proximity is a greater threat, as the execution team’s work from an adjacent
room has always been partially obstructed by blinds, the inmate faces away from window,
and the inmate’s entire body except for his face has been completely covered by a sheet.
Taylor, 487 F.3d at 1072.
Linked to proximity, a range of other problems have been noted as well, including
overcrowding in the chamber adjacent to the execution room and potential problems with
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failed to specify what dosages are necessary to ensure proper lethal
injection while others lack clear guidance for prison officials in the event
of a botched execution.94
The most common death row inmates’ Section 1983 contests at
present regard the use of a muscle relaxing, paralytic drug called
pancuronium bromide, or Pavulon, in the lethal injection protocol.95
Pavulon is the second in a three-drug sequence called for by the
protocols of thirty-five states and the federal government.96 Potentially,
if inexperienced officials don’t inject a sufficient amount of the first drug,
a form of sodium, to render the prisoner unconscious or otherwise inject
Pavulon at the wrong time interval thereafter, a death row inmate could
be forced to endure the third, killing drug—a potassium chloride

positioning and testing IV bags. Henry Weinstein & Maura Dolan, State Defends Execution
Procedure, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2006, at 3, available at 2006 WLNR 19528769.
94
See Miller, supra note 47 (commenting on the three main causes of botched lethal
injections); Morales, 465 F. Supp. 2d 792, 979-80; Brown, 2006 WL 3914717, at *8; Taylor v.
Crawford, No. 05-4173-CV-C-FJG, 2006 WL 1779035 (W.D. Mo. June 26, 2006), rev’d 487
F.3d 1072 (8th Cir. 2007).
95
A first drug, sodium thiopental or sodium pentothal, is a barbiturate for anesthetics.
COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 18, at 86. Given at 2000 mg, (twice what patients receive
during long medical operations) it quickly makes a patient unconscious. Id. Pancuronium
bromide (“Pavulon”) is a muscle relaxant common to heart surgeries, but when given at 10
times the normal dose (100 mg), as in lethal injections, it causes paralysis and respiratory
failure. Id. Nevertheless, because Pavulon, if used alone, would take around ten minutes
to kill a person, lethal injection protocols utilize potassium chloride (used in bypass surgery
to relax the heart and stop its pumping) to accomplish that result in about ten seconds. Id.
The court in Workman cited state analyses of one and two-drug execution protocols which
would each eliminate the use of Pavulon, but for various reasons, Tennessee refused to
adopt either. Workman, 486 F.3d at 902-03. Disadvantages feared in the two-drug protocol
included the likelihood of “involuntary movement which might be misinterpreted as a
seizure or an indication of consciousness” and the fact that no other jurisdiction had
experience with such a protocol from which to borrow confidence. Id. at 902-03, 919. A
one-chemical protocol, much like the simple and less risky procedure used to euthanize
animals, would simply be a massive dosage to induce cardiac arrest. Id. The
disadvantages of such an approach would be unpredictability, the fact that it has not been
tested on humans by any state, and that it is slow and might therefore result in
unconstitutionally prolonged or lingering death. Id. Even so, there are at least three
disadvantages to the three-drug protocol as well: that Pavulon requires refrigeration; that
there is a chance of error in implementation; and that obtaining, storing, and safeguarding
lethal injection chemicals can be complicated. Workman, 486 F.3d at 918 Appx. A.
96
Deborah W. Denno, When Legislatures Delegate Death: The Troubling Paradox Behind
State Uses of Electrocution and Lethal Injection and What It Says About Us, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 63,
at 146 tbl. 11 (2002).
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injection which causes muscle cramping and cardiac arrest—while
simultaneously conscious and paralyzed.97
Although courts will eventually be obliged to decide whether being
put to death while conscious and paralyzed is itself cruel and unusual,
thus far, most are occupied by the initial question of whether
inexperienced technicians and inconclusive execution protocols create a
grave risk of cruel and unusual harm.98 What Eighth Amendment case
Leonidas G. Koniaris, Teresa A. Zimmers, David A. Lubarsky, & Jonathan P. Sheldon,
Inadequate Anesthesia in Lethal Injection for Execution, 365 THE LANCET 1412 (Apr. 16-22,
2005). The Lancet article has been the primary impetus for current Section 1983 claims.
John Gibeaut, A Painful Way to Die?, A.B.A. J. 20-21 (Apr. 2006). According to Dr. Mark J. S.
Heath, an expert on lethal injection commonly sought out by inmates, Pavulon paralyzes
not only a person’s body but his lungs as well, which means that prisoners may suffocate
while the last drug causes muscle cramping and a fatal heart attack. E.g., Abdur’Rahman,
181 S.W.3d at 300-03. Dr. Heath testified that the drug creates a “chemical veil,” preventing
witnesses and officials from noticing an inmate’s suffering. Id. at 302. The plaintiff in Hill
particularly alleged the first drug was insufficient to make a person unconscious for
suffocation and death. Hill, 126 S. Ct. at 2100. This much was confirmed by Carol Weiher,
founder and president of Anesthesia Awareness Campaign, who in 1998 was anaesthetized
using Pavulon during a medical procedure but woke up in a state of paralysis, cognizant of
what was going on but unable to speak or move. Abdur’Rahman, 181 S.W.3d at 303. But see
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (explaining that the opinions of experts do not
determine constitutional requirements but are subservient to the better determinant of
contemporary standards of decency: the public attitude); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337,
350 (1981).
[S]uch opinions may be helpful and relevant with respect to some
questions, but “they simply do not establish the constitutional minima;
rather, they establish goals recommended by the organization in
question.” . . . Indeed, generalized opinions of experts cannot weigh as
heavily in determining contemporary standards of decency as “the
public attitude toward a given sanction.”
Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 350; see also infra notes 111-12, 173, 175, 197 and accompanying text
(regarding the public attitude or public interest as a factor in the propriety of injunctive
relief).
98
E.g., Hill v. McDonough, 126 S. Ct. 2096, 2104 (2006) (remanding for a determination
on the merits regarding Florida’s lethal injection protocol); Hill v. McDonough, 2006 WL
2556938 *2-4 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 1, 2006) (deciding, without reaching the merits, that Hill’s
claim was untimely). The states that have had occasion to determine the constitutionality
of Pavulon have returned mixed results. See Workman, 486 F.3d at 905-09 (stating that the
methods used currently do not cause cruel and unusual harm because: (1) the Supreme
Court has never invalidated any method of execution; (2) lower state and federal courts
have held the same; (3) contemporary standards of decency support this conclusion; and
(4) there is no wantonness or deliberate indifference in a procedure aimed at painavoidance); Taylor v. Crawford, 487 F.3d 1072, 1085 (8th Cir. 2007); Emmett v. Johnson, 489
F. Supp. 2d 543, 543 (E.D. Va. 2007); Abdur’Rahman, 181 S.W.3d at 308-09 (finding no risk of
unnecessary physical and psychological suffering and thus no cruel and unusual
punishment in Tennessee’s lethal injection protocol even under its former version). Contra
Morales, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 979-80; Brown, 2006 WL 3914717, at *8 (each conditionally
barring lethal injection as unconstitutional unless and until specific changes are made).
97

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol42/iss3/6

Oldenkamp: Civil Rights in the Execution Chamber: Why Death Row Inmates' Sec

2008]

Civil Rights in the Execution Chamber

983

law has developed on these conditions of confinement cases, at the
Supreme Court level, is presented next.
2.

Supreme Court Interpretation in Recent Death Row Inmates’ Section
1983 Actions

For cruel and unusual punishment claims, the Supreme Court first
delineated when conditions of confinement actions could be brought
alone, without traditional habeas pleading, in the 2004 non-death
penalty case of Muhammad v. Close.99 Muhammad offered a reliable
distinction between core habeas corpus actions, “hybrid[]” habeas plus
Section 1983 actions, and purely Section 1983 conditions of confinement
actions upon which future civil rights actions might proceed.100 Citing a

The opponents of the three-drug procedure do so oppose it for various reasons. Some
have deemed the use of Pavulon torturous, hence cruel and unusual by definition. Witt,
supra note 93, at 8. Indeed, Texas, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Virginia, North Carolina, and
Ohio courts have all heard arguments that Pavulon, “which does nothing to prevent the
experience of pain, renders condemned inmates unable to speak, twitch or cry out in
response to it.” Id. It is undisputed that the inherent properties of the second and third
chemicals, respectively, are to mask any visible signs of pain and cause extreme pain where
there is improper anaesthetization. Taylor, 487 F.3d at 1082. Using the same rationale, it
would seem that if the problem is insufficient anesthesia to make a person unconscious, the
case concerns a risk of lingering death, also cruel and unusual punishment. Id. The agony
of capital punishment is said to derive from not only the prospect of pain but also the
expectation of death, exemplified in the long process of waiting (or mock executions) which
are commonly used worldwide as psychological torture. COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note
18, at 87. Other potential problems, especially in the absence of medical personnel, include
injection into muscle instead of vein, a problem which once caused an inmate named James
Autry to die slowly, consciously, moving around, and complaining of pain. Id. at 86. In a
successful lethal injection procedure, on the other hand, “[t]he only physical pain, if the
killing is done correctly, ‘is the pain of the initial prick of the needle.’” Id. The execution of
Lawrence Lee Buxton in 1991, for example, was one that proceeded as planned, in that all
that witnesses heard was a deep breath by the prisoner, then a gurgling noise as his tongue
dropped back in his mouth. Id.; see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 282 (1972)
(Brennan, J., concurring).
99
540 U.S. 749 (2004).
100
Id. at 750-51. Core habeas challenges are those regarding the validity of one’s
conviction or sentence or the duration of one’s stay in prison. Id. at 750 (citing Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973)). Hybrid actions are where a prisoner seeks a damages
remedy, which habeas does not provide, whereas the claim itself challenges the validity or
duration of the sentence. Id. at 750 (citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994)). The
rule in Heck says that a claim brought under Section 1983 will be treated instead as a habeas
action, subject to AEDPA rigors, where the issues are core issues of duration or validity. Id.
According to the Muhammad Court, Edwards v. Balisok featured one such validity action in
disguise, where an inmate attempted at damages and equitable relief for procedural defects
in a prison’s administrative processes. Id. at 751 (citing Edwards, 520 U.S. 641 (1997)). For
true Section 1983 claims, which only challenge conditions of confinement, the Prison
Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2000), operates instead of the Heck rule and the
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hybrid claim rule from Heck v. Humphrey, Muhammad stated that any
inmate’s death penalty challenge which necessarily implies the factual or
legal invalidity of his death sentence is actually a successive habeas
petition in Section 1983 clothing.101 Courts, by looking through form to
substance, should treat a hybrid claim the same as a core habeas
complaint rather than a conditions of confinement claim as pled.102
Nelson v. Campbell, following closely on the heels of Muhammad, was
the first Supreme Court case to prohibit a specific execution procedure as
an unlawful condition of confinement on Eighth Amendment grounds.103
Without solidifying the Eighth Amendment fate of “method-of-execution
claims generally,” that Court explained that a cut-down procedure to
gain venous access for lethal injection was at best a gratuitous element of
the procedure, unnecessary to Alabama’s death penalty punishment.104
AEDPA, merely requiring exhaustion of state administrative remedies prior to court action.
Id.
101
512 U.S. 477 (1994); Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750-51 (2004).
102
See supra note 100; infra note 108.
103
541 U.S. 637 (2004). David Nelson was permitted in a Section 1983 action to challenge
Alabama’s use of the “cut-down” procedure to access the veins of prisoners executed by
lethal injection as cruel and unusual punishment, since an alternative procedure, the
“central line” procedure was not unlawful in the state’s lethal injection statute and was
personally acceptable to him. Id. at 646; see infra note 104. Assuming Nelson is applicable to
any conduct surrounding executions that can be described as a condition of confinement, it
might invalidate, in whole or in part, Florida’s secondary execution method, the electric
chair. Id. at 647, 650. Florida’s electric chair has malfunctioned on several occasions,
causing unnecessary pain to its victims. Kearns, supra note 5, at 207. Because the state is
not bound by statute to use that particular chair or electrocution whatsoever, the option to
demand the state to use a substitute electric chair is viable (barring cost as a compelling
countervailing government interest), and standards of decency would seem to support the
same decision. Nevertheless, when the Florida Supreme Court took up this exact scenario
in Jones v. State, 701 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 1997), it ignored evolving standards of decency and
instead determined the use of a frequently malfunctioning chair was not a wanton or
deliberately indifferent rendition of unnecessary pain upon the state’s prisoners. Id. at 77.
104
Nelson, 541 U.S. at 645-46 (emphasis omitted). While declining the defendant’s
argument that a ruling favorable to the death row plaintiff would flood the courts as a
result, the Supreme Court refused to resolve “how to treat method-of-execution claims
generally.” Id. at 644, 649. Hill did the same in effect. Hill v. McDonough, 126 S. Ct. 2096,
2102 (2006) (avoiding the issue of method-of-execution analysis generally because Nelson is
controlling precedent). Regarding the non-necessity of the cut-down procedure, the Court
in Nelson said:
That venous access is a necessary prerequisite does not imply that a
particular means of gaining such access is likewise necessary. Indeed,
the gravamen of petitioner’s entire claim is that the use of the cutdown would be gratuitous. Merely labeling something as part of an
execution procedure is insufficient to insulate it from § 1983 attack. If
as a legal matter the cut-down were a statutorily mandated part of the
lethal injection protocol, or if as a factual matter petitioner were unable
or unwilling to concede acceptable alternatives for gaining venous
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In the wake of Nelson, Section 1983 represents the only cause of action in
United States history, aside from a petition for writ of habeas corpus,
recognized to bring death penalty claims under the Eighth
Amendment.105
In June 2006, the Supreme Court reaffirmed and built on Nelson in
Hill v. McDonough.106 Hill allowed a convict to challenge in advance the
foreseeable risk that execution conditions or protocols using Pavulon or
like paralytic agents would cause gratuitous and unnecessary pain.107
The primary limitation on death penalty conditions cases, in the order
access, respondents might have a stronger argument that success on
the merits, coupled with injunctive relief, would call into question the
death sentence itself. . . . No Alabama statute requires use of the cutdown, . . . respondents have offered no duly-promulgated regulations
to the contrary . . . [and] the State now seems willing to implement
petitioner’s proposed alternatives.
Nelson, 541 U.S. at 645-46. But see Workman v. Bredesen, 486 F.3d 896, 903 (6th Cir. 2007)
(acknowledging that Tennessee permits the cut-down procedure where a usable vein
cannot be found).
105
See Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135-36 (1879); Muhammad, 540 U.S. 749. See also
Kearns, supra note 5, at 198-99 (commenting particularly on the inordinate span of time
between cases actually approaching method-of-execution analysis, namely Wilkerson in
1879 and Roper in 2005).
106
126 S. Ct. 2096 (2006). In Nelson, the Court explained that its recognition of a valid
Section 1983 action was narrow and did not specifically permit method-of-execution claims
generally under Section 1983. Nelson, 541 U.S. at 649. In Hill, no limitation was stated on
the availability of Section 1983 to challenge conditions of confinement (as opposed to the
death sentence or duration of confinement), and only cursory heed was given to the
difference from the Nelson case factually, namely: challenging the chemical injection
sequence (Hill) versus challenging the surgical procedures prior to lethal injection (Nelson).
Hill, 126 S. Ct. at 2102. In a strange move, perhaps because Nelson was controlling, the Hill
Court also ignored the method-of-execution reasoning it used in Roper just one year before,
deferring instead to the Eleventh Circuit’s contemporary standards of decency
consideration from below while leaving Roper’s evolving standards approach
unchallenged. Id. at 2104.
107
Hill, 126 S. Ct. at 2102. Of the thirty-seven states which employ lethal injection as their
primary statutory means of execution, all but one uses the same three-drug sequence of
injected chemicals. See Denno, supra note 96, at 146 tbl. 11 (New Jersey uses a substitute for
Pavulon). Because the Florida state legislature did not draw up particular lethal injection
protocol in statute nor require its Department of Corrections to do so and because Clarence
Hill was denied access to any such information, he had to base his claim upon the
likelihood that the state would use the same procedures that were described in a case from
five years prior, Sims v. State. 754 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 2000); Hill, 126 S. Ct. at 2100. In Sims, the
state had actually permitted access to the detailed protocol in advance. Hill, 126 S. Ct. at
2100. See supra notes 88-89. In sum, because petitioner Hill did not challenge the sentence
itself, his case did not sound in habeas under Nelson but in enjoining the state “from
executing [Hill] in the manner they currently intend” where the anticipated protocol was
alleged to cause “‘a foreseeable risk of . . . gratuitous and unnecessary’ pain.” Hill, 126 S. Ct.
at 2102.
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addressed by Hill, is the hybrid rule from Heck.108 A second barrier,
provided the claim is truly a “conditions” case, is the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (“PLRA”).109 The PLRA bars frivolous and malicious claims,
claims for which no relief can be granted, claims which precede
exhaustion of available state administrative channels, or claims where
damages are sought from an immune public official.110 Lastly, if the
108
See supra note 100 and accompanying text. Hill returned to the essential question of
whether relief sought by an inmate would challenge the “fact” or “validity” of a sentence in
purpose or effect. Nelson, 541 U.S. at 644. The Court in Nelson said, “imposition of the
death penalty presupposes a means of carrying it out.” Nelson, 541 U.S. at 644. Under the
Heck rule, habeas actions challenge the fact of confinement or its duration, and are bound
by the AEDPA. Hill, 126 S. Ct. at 2101. Whether seeking injunctive or monetary relief, on
the other hand, “an inmate’s challenge to the circumstances of his confinement . . . may be
brought under § 1983.” Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004). See also Nelson, 541
U.S. at 647, supra note 59. Absent a finding that inmate Hill challenged procedure which
was necessary to the lethal injection, the Court concluded, as it had in Nelson, that
injunctive relief would not prevent the State from implementing the sentence. Hill, 126 S.
Ct. at 2101. Consequently, the suit as presented would not be deemed a challenge to the
fact of “the sentence itself.” Id. The same was much less nobly ensured under habeas. In
Dawson v. Georgia, the Georgia Supreme Court had waited for the state legislature to
provide lethal injection as the preferred death penalty alternative, with electrocution at a
prisoner’s election. 554 S.E.2d 137 (Ga. 2001). Only six months later did that court allow
the first prisoner challenge to electrocution itself as cruel and unusual as that state
employed it, something that had never been allowed when electrocution was the only
statutory option, regardless of how cruel and unusual the procedure might have been.
Kearns, supra note 5, at 211.
109
Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 650 (2004); see supra note 100. The PLRA states, in
relevant part, as follows:
(a) Applicability of administrative remedies
No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under
section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner
confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such
administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.
(b) Failure of State to adopt or adhere to administrative grievance
procedure
The failure of a State to adopt or adhere to an administrative grievance
procedure shall not constitute the basis for an action under section
1997a or 1997c of this title.
(c) Dismissal
(1) The court shall on its own motion or on the motion of a
party dismiss any action brought with respect to prison
conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other
Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or
other correctional facility if the court is satisfied that the
action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief.
Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)-(c)(1) (2000).
110
Id. As a basic rule, Section 1983 does not require plaintiffs to exhaust state remedies.
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). This continues to be true for all state judicial avenues.
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action survives PLRA rigors, Hill instructed the trial court, on remand, to
determine the inmate’s likelihood of success on the merits.111 At that
stage, inmates must prove a substantial risk that gratuitous pain will be
inflicted.112 When each of these limitations has been surpassed, an
Id. However, in Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents, the Supreme Court permitted the
exhaustion of state administrative channels requirement which Congress delineated in
creating the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (predecessor to
the PLRA of 1995). 457 U.S. 496 (1982). This law created a specific exhaustion requirement
for adult prisoners using Section 1983 and was validated because of a specific
Congressional departure from the usual non-exhaustion rule, as opposed to relying on a
judicially-imposed exhaustion requirement. Id. Exhaustion of administrative remedies,
pursuant to PLRA, is required for all prisoners seeking redress for prison circumstances or
occurrences, regardless of whether they involve general circumstances of incarceration or
particular episodes, and whether they allege Eighth Amendment violations based on use of
excessive force or some other wrong.
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; Civil Rights of
Institutionalized Persons Act, § 7(a); Porter v. Nussle, 122 S. Ct. 983 (2002).
111
Hill v. McDonough, 126 S. Ct. 2096, 2103 (2006). The case has since been decided on
remand, and Hill has been executed. Hill v. McDonough, 127 S. Ct. 34 (Sept. 20, 2006)
(denying stay of execution); Brief Wire, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Sept. 21, 2006, available at 2006
WLNR 16361036 (stating that Hill had been put to death). Likelihood of success on the
merits is included among the following four factors balanced when most courts determine
whether to award preliminary injunctive relief: “(1) the likelihood of irreparable harm to
the plaintiff if the preliminary injunction is denied, (2) the likelihood of harm to the
defendant if the requested relief is granted, (3) the likelihood that the plaintiff will succeed
on the merits, and (4) the public interest.” Emmett v. Johnson, 489 F. Supp. 2d 543, 548
(E.D. Va. 2007). See, e.g., Workman v. Bredesen, 486 F.3d 896, 905 (6th Cir. 2007); Brown v.
Beck, 2006 WL 3914717, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 7, 2006). In California, injunctive relief is also
possible if an inmate can demonstrate “either a combination of probable success on the
merits and the possibility of irreparable injury or that serious questions are raised by the
balance of hardships tips sharply in his favor.” Morales v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 792, 1040
(N.D. Cal. 2006). Under the latter test, “the greater the relative hardship to the party
seeking the preliminary injunction, the less probability of success must be established by
the party.” Id. For instance, the Fourth Circuit holds that the absence of meaningful
retrospective remedies (for executed inmates) lessens the inmate’s showing required for
preliminary injunctions in cases involving Section 1983 violations. Brown, 2006 WL
3914717, at *6 (citing Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc. v. Caperton, 926 F.2d 353, 362 (4th Cir.
1991) (balancing the likelihood of irreparable harms to each party)). See Richmond
Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571, 593, 597-98; supra notes 34, 64; infra note 172 and
accompanying text (concerning the public’s interest in execution).
112
Likelihood of success on the merits has thus far been difficult to prove in courts which
don’t accept that Pavulon use substantially risks gratuitous pain. The Supreme Courts of
Tennessee and Connecticut refused to believe Pavulon creates such a risk, relying, prior to
Hill, on an old test for methods and procedures of execution challenges from Weems v.
United States. 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910); Abdur’Rahman v. Bredesen, 181 S.W.3d 292, 306
(Tenn. 2005); State v. Webb, 750 A.2d 448 (Conn. 2000). That analysis considered: (1) if a
method falls within contemporary standards of decency; (2) if a method offends the dignity
of a prisoner and society; (3) if a method causes unnecessary physical pain; and (4) if a
method causes unnecessary psychological suffering. Abdur’Rahman, 181 S.W.3d at 206.
This Weems analysis would appear to be obsolete now that Hill has set forth new standards
for injunctive relief in conditions cases. See, e.g., Workman, 486 F.3d at 905-09 (finding no
likelihood of success on the merits having made four different observations on cruel and
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inmate has apparently succeeded in proving cruel and unusual
punishment under Hill.
In summary, death row inmates can now challenge not only the very
validity or prolongation of their death sentences for inflicting cruel and
unusual punishment in habeas cases, but also the means by which or
circumstances under which they face their death penalties. These
circumstances may include what procedure is used to access their veins
and what preliminary chemicals are injected into them.113 To address
these new claims, the Supreme Court has not attempted to adapt its
traditionally relied upon method-of-execution analysis. Instead, the
Court set forth a framework in Nelson and Hill specifically for conditions
of confinement Section 1983 claims, without expressly attempting to
reconcile the two approaches.114
III. ANALYSIS
While the Hill decision has mobilized death row inmates nationwide
to test the conditions of confinement avenue for relief, both Nelson and
Hill underscored the need to reconcile the approach to this fledgling
Section 1983 line of cases with its longstanding predecessor, the methodof-execution jurisprudence.115 The Court’s conceded failure to reconcile
modern conditions cases with “method–of-execution claims generally”
implies that Hill’s current test for preliminary injunctive relief, while
workable thus far, is simply a temporary fix.116 Taking this cue, the
analysis that follows offers a firm resolution adopting the prevailing
unusual punishment); Emmett, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 552-54 (no likelihood of success on the
merits); Taylor v. Crawford, 487 F.3d 1072, 1084-85 (8th Cir. 2007). But see Morales, 415 F.
Supp. 2d at 1047 (preliminary injunction conditionally denied); Brown, 2006 WL 3914717, at
*8 (preliminary injunction conditionally denied).
113
Nelson, 541 U.S. at 645-46 (denying use of the “cut-down” procedure for gaining
venous access); Hill, 126 S. Ct. 2096 (remanding for determination of the constitutionality of
Pavulon, the second in a three drug lethal injection sequence); see supra notes 104, 107 and
accompanying text. Media reports that describe these Section 1983 actions as attacks on the
death penalty itself are mistaken. Workman, 415 F. Supp. 2d at 1040. These cases are about
neither death penalty’s morality nor methods of execution employed, but about particular
procedures implemented. Morales, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 973.
114
See supra Part II.B (method-of-execution analysis). See supra text accompanying notes
109-13 (Hill test for cruel and unusual punishment conditions of confinement allegations).
115
See supra notes 104, 106 ( (highlighting where the Court in each instance deferred on
the issue of method-of-execution determinations).
116
Nelson, 541 U.S. at 645. See supra text accompanying notes 109-13 (Hill test for cruel
and unusual punishment conditions of confinement allegations). Nelson/Hill analysis has
been succeeded by several lower court cases E.g., Workman, 486 F.3d at 905-09; Emmett, 489
F. Supp. 2d at 552-54; Taylor, 487 F.3d at 1084-85; Morales, 415 F. Supp. 2d at 1047; Brown,
2006 WL 3914717, at *8.
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approach for its new jurisprudential counterpart.
The proposed
reconciliation, as the remainder of this Note argues, promotes the policy
goals and the public interest common to each cause of action better than
has been done previously.117 Part III.A offers a means to reconcile habeas
and Section 1983 determinations. Part III.B then discusses what
government interests fit within the category “penological,” as is required
whenever consciously or in effect depriving prisoners’ constitutional
rights.118 Finally, Part III.C examines which penological interests are
legitimate goals within lethal injection procedures as currently
applied.119
A. Reconciling Method-of-Execution Analysis and Section 1983 Claims
Historically, habeas and Section 1983 death penalty claims may
appear to share scant common grounds for consolidation into a singular
method-of-execution analysis.120
Yet, despite disagreement within
method-of-execution precedent over the objective and subjective
determinants of “evolving” versus “contemporary” standards of
decency, habeas and Section 1983 jurisprudence each can turn on
legitimate penological objectives in Eighth Amendment adjudication.121
In each context, both Section 1983 and habeas profess to place a
prisoner’s constitutional rights higher than either non-penological or
illegitimate penological interests.122 Any distinction between the two lies

117
See supra note 29 and accompanying text (method-of-execution analysis); see supra
notes 109-13 and accompanying text (Hill test for cruel and unusual punishment conditions
of confinement allegations). See infra Part IV.
118
See infra Part III.B.
119
See infra Part III.C.
120
Compare supra Part II.B (history of method-of-execution analysis in habeas), with supra
Part II.C (history of Eighth Amendment and Section 1983 conditions of confinement
actions).
121
See supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text (discussing the objective determinant of
both evolving and contemporary standards of decency concepts—legislative enactments—
and the subjective factors considered only in evolving standards of decency analysis:
substantial shifts in society and international indicators). Compare supra Part II.B.3
(elaborating on legitimate penological objectives in method-of-execution analysis), with
supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text (discussing the same objectives required in
Section 1983 conditions of confinement actions, in First and Eighth Amendment precedent).
122
See supra notes 18, 20, 26, 55-56, 81 and accompanying text (each describing in part the
principle that prisoners retain all their rights unless reasonably or non-excessively taken
from them in pursuit of legitimate state penological objectives by virtue of their status as
inmates).
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only in what objectives are perceived to be penological and legitimate
objectives.123
A second conceptual barrier is anticipating what an inmate’s
method-of-execution challenge to a legitimate penological interest might
entail, considering that the history of habeas actions, while inundated
with decency and proportionality concerns, is devoid of the sort of death
penalty penology determinations which Coker supposed to be possible.124
Conversely, it appears that every conditions of confinement claim
challenges precisely penological interests, that is, the reasons why
prisons employ particular means of treating inmates.125 Just as judicial
deference is given in habeas cases where the state proffers legitimate
rationale for capital punishment, there would be no apparent reason, in
conditions of confinement cases, for judicial deference to be withheld if
the government were to offer Coker-consistent legitimate penological
objectives for specifically challenged death row conditions.126
In defense of their conditions of confinement, governments might
posit an array of legitimate penological objectives. Retribution and
deterrence would seem to top the list, and they are potent at the
sentencing phase or when considering proportionality of punishment
concerns, but of them, only deterrence has been cited as a justification for
See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 350 (1981) (defining the retribution, deterrence,
and rehabilitation interests in “the penal function”); see also Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817,
823 (1974); Workman v. Bredesen, 486 F.3d 896, 909 (6th Cir. 2007) (introducing the
penological interests in institutional and execution chamber safety and their scope). See
supra Parts II.B.1-2 (describing historical developments in standards of decency and
proportionality method-of-execution factors).
124
See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (describing how challenges to legitimate
penological objectives would look if ever undertaken); see also supra note 56 (illuminating
how rarely courts have considered a challenge to penologcial objectives through methodof-execution means).
125
See Pell, 417 U.S. at 817, 822-23; supra Part II.B.2.
126
See supra note 60 (describing federalism and legislative competence as reasons for
deference). See also Nelson, 541 U.S at 644.
[A] constitutional challenge seeking to permanently enjoin the use of
lethal injection may amount to a challenge to the fact of the sentence
itself. A finding of unconstitutionality would require statutory
amendment or variance, imposing significant costs on the State and the
administration of its penal system. And while it makes little sense to
talk about the ‘duration’ of a death sentence, a State retains a
significant interest in meting out a sentence of death in a timely
fashion.
Id. The PLRA, similarly, provides for a check on injunctive relief of any sort, requiring that
extra weight be given should the outcome have “any adverse impact on . . . the operation of
a criminal justice system.” Id. at 650 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)-(2) (2000)); see supra notes
26, 55-56 and accompanying text (describing the Coker test).
123
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the treatment of prisoners outside the realm of death row.127 Along with
deterrence, First Amendment cases have stipulated that rehabilitation
and internal prison safety are penological justifications for various
conditions of confinement unrelated to the death penalty.128 Given the
death penalty context of this Note, rehabilitation will not, however, be
entertained as a possible penological interest for the same reason that
deterrence is not aimed at death row inmates themselves: the state has
not vested an interest in the betterment of condemned persons.129
Internal prison safety and security, on the other hand, has been
pinpointed as a penological feature that might contribute to a substantial
risk of gratuitous pain in the execution chamber.130
Without
hypothecating other specific, legitimate penological interests called for
by lethal injection, this analysis will, consistent with Nelson and Hill, sum
up institutional security and all interests other than retribution and
deterrence under the heading “administrative necessity.”131

127
See supra Part II.B.3 (traditional application of retribution and deterrence objectives);
Pell, 417 U.S. at 822-23; supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
128
See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822-23 (1974); supra notes 80-82 and accompanying
text.
129
See supra note 70 and accompanying text (describing how, except for believers in
specific or incapacitation deterrence, the Supreme Court and academia generally do not
advance the death penalty as a deterrent for death row inmates themselves).
130
See Pell, 417 U.S. 817, 822-23; supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text (describing the
penological interest in institutional safety); Workman v. Bredesen, 486 F.3d 896, 909-10 (6th
Cir. 2007) (stating that, for security reasons, no medical personnel are permitted near the
prisoner during execution in Tennessee); supra note 47 and accompanying text (discussing
varying views in the law and medical community on the ethics and necessity of medically
trained personnel in the lethal injection process). Inmates’ claims to injury are strongly
related to the absence or distance of medically trained personnel in their last moments, a
presence so integral that, in light of the fact that leading medical organizations frown upon
participation in executions, a court ordering more physician involvement is considered by
some to be tantamount to banning executions. See supra note 93 (citing California Atty.
Gen. Dane R. Gillette).
131
See infra Part III.C.2. Said the Nelson Court:
[W]e have previously concluded that a § 1983 suit for damages that
would ‘necessarily imply’ the invalidity of the fact of a inmate’s
conviction, or ‘necessarily imply’ the invalidity of the length of an
inmate’s sentence, is not cognizable under § 1983 unless and until the
inmate obtains favorable termination of a state, or federal habeas,
challenge to his conviction or sentence. . . . Even so, we were careful in
Heck to stress the importance of the term ‘necessarily.’
Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 646-47 (2004) (limiting the scope of “necessity” to
indispensable or otherwise hardly challengeable aspects of execution procedures). Hill v.
McDonough, 126 S. Ct. 2096, 2102 (2006) (affirming Nelson despite the argument in the
State’s amici that no component of any execution procedure could stand against the Nelson
rule because none may be “strictly necessary”); see supra note 108 (explaining how the term
“necessarily” applies when the state would in law or fact be unable to carry out its
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B. Penological Objectives: the Conditions of Confinement Threshold
Assuming a death row inmate has made the prima facie Section 1983
showing that certain conditions of confinement create a substantial risk
of serious harm, the government ought to have a basic burden of
production to demonstrate those conditions were penological necessities
rather than gratuitous measures.132 Gratuitous infliction of pain is
presumably synonymous with excessive, unnecessary, and unusual
execution by any other means). Given that most states defer to Department of Corrections
administration of the death penalty and that Nelson and Hill have narrowly defined what
conditions of confinement are strictly necessary to states in the event of Section 1983
constitutional challenge, the term administrative necessity seems an appropriate
summation of the states’ rebuttal burden. See supra note 83.
132
See Hill, 126 S. Ct. at 2102. It is important to acknowledge that necessity, like nonwantonness, is distinctly a feature of determining penological interests and not
proportionality or standards of decency. The Eighth Amendment “requires, in part, an
inquiry into whether a punishment is excessive, and that inquiry has two aspects. . . . First,
the punishment must not involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Second,
the punishment must not be grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime.” Taylor,
487 F.3d at 1079 (internal citations omitted). Wantonness or cruelty is a separate feature of
gratuitous punishment than non-necessity and unusualness, and the former requires at
least deliberate indifference. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). “[I]n any given
§ 1983 suit, the plaintiff must still prove a violation of the underlying constitutional right;
and depending on the right, merely negligent conduct may not be enough to state a claim.”
Id. at 330. But see Taylor v. Crawford, 487 F.3d 1072 (8th Cir. 2007); Workman v. Bredesen,
486 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2007); Morales v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972 (N.D. Cal. 2006); supra
notes 133, 138, 163, 213-214. The prevailing test for deliberate indifference is from Wilson v.
Seiter: first, direct, particularized harm or substantial risk of harm, that harm being a
serious injury by contemporary standards of decency; second, the state defendant’s
culpable state of mind, which is a requirement for actual or reasonable knowledge of the
wrongfulness of the condition and not necessarily maliciousness. 501 U.S. 294 (1991); see
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (discussing active commission of deliberate
indifference); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (requiring a prima facie showing of
particularized injury; discussing passive denial as deliberate indifference); Nelson, 541 U.S.
at 645 (vindicating a claim for gratuitous punishment as the basis for a Section 1983 claim).
Rather than address in depth the idea of deliberate indifference, the purpose of this
Note is instead to explore the necessity aspect of capital punishment, and for that reason
the question of whether plaintiffs can prove cruel intent, by no means an uncontroversial
issue, is set aside. Some states and authorities, post-Hill, have said that inmates cannot
prove deliberate indifference in the states’ usage of various lethal injection protocols and
therefore that at least the cruel component of unconstitutional punishment does not exist,
others that proving intentional indifference may be impertinent if states’ procedures have
manifest deficiencies, and others still that the punishment is torturous, promotes lingering
death, or causes psychological torture. See supra note 98 (noting these opposing viewpoints
on the cruelty component); supra note 55 (torture is inherently indecent). What this Note
does address is the substance of excessiveness—whether, if a practice creates substantial
risks, it is justified by sufficiently tailored and legitimately necessary means to override an
inmate’s preservation of whatever rights are not required by legitimate penological
objectives, his status as a prisoner, or the punishment itself. See supra notes 20, 81 and
accompanying text.
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The essential distinction between penological objectives which
validate the punishment and those which justify conditions of
confinement “that do[] not purport to be punishment” is that of
necessary and unnecessary pain.134 Justifiably, the former category tends
to receive deference, since a certain amount of pain and suffering inheres
in being forcibly put to death.135 In the latter category, however,
deference to retained prisoners’ rights is more likely, because conditions
of confinement, unlike the ultimate punishment awaiting death row
inmates, are not or must not be themselves intended by states and
correctional officials as instruments of cruel and unusual pain and
suffering.136 Excessive punishment is not justified by prisoner status per
se, reflecting a presumption in favor of Eighth Amendment rights as
See supra note 8 (quoting Justice Brennan’s concurrence in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238, 279 (1972)); Hill, 126 S. Ct. at 2101-02 (methods which are not required by statute or
which as a matter of fact have alternatives are not “necessary”); Nelson, 541 U.S. at 644-46;
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) (unusual punishment is not contemplated or not
standardized). See generally supra notes 2-15 (inferring the synonymy of the terms
excessive, wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain and suffering, and unusual
punishment); see supra note 132.
134
24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 2204 (2007) (“[C]onduct that does not purport to be
punishment at all must involve more than ordinary lack of due care, inadvertence, or good
faith error to constitute cruel and unusual punishment.”). Trop offered some aid in
deciphering penological interests:
If the statute imposes a disability for the purposes of punishment—
that is, to reprimand the wrongdoer, to deter others, etc., it has been
considered penal. But a statute has been considered nonpenal if it
imposes a disability, not to punish, but to accomplish some other
legitimate governmental purpose.
Trop, 356 U.S. at 96; see id. at 110.
[T]he Eighth Amendment’s prohibition is directed against cruel and
unusual punishments. It does not, by its terms, regulate the procedures
of sentencing as opposed to the substance of punishment. As THE
CHIEF JUSTICE has observed, “[t]he prohibition of the Eighth
Amendment relates to the character of the punishment, and not to the
process by which it is imposed.”
Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 670 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting, in part, Gardner
v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 371 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
135
See Louisiana ex rel Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 464 (1947) (stating that
unconstitutional cruelty cannot logically include “cruelty inherent in the method of
punishment . . . [that being] the necessary suffering involved”); supra note 24.
136
See supra notes 20, 80-82 and accompanying text (describing that prisoners’ rights can
only be deprived for legitimate penological reasons or because of prisoner status). A
Section 1983 action under Hill may challenge the lawful or factual validity of a condition of
confinement, whereas alleging the invalidity of a punishment itself would be a hybrid
claim sent to endure habeas rigors because of the Heck rule. See supra notes 100, 108.
133
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against injurious conditions of confinement until the punishment itself
begins and unless specific Section 1983 allegations are met with specific
penological justification.137
The Court in Hill confirmed that the punishment of death, that
portion of treatment justified by retribution and deterrence interests in
habeas jurisprudence, only occurs in the very last moments of an
inmate’s life.138 In Hill, an inmate was permitted to challenge the secondto-last step of lethal injection protocol, that of Pavulon injection, as a
“condition” or “circumstance” of confinement, even though Pavulon is
introduced just moments before the injection of death-inducing
potassium chloride or sodium thiopental.139
Hill stands for the
proposition that the death penalty does not begin until the causation of
death itself is induced in the form of a chemical which causes cardiac

137
See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text (noting that only the First Amendment
has explicitly deemed status of a prisoner among the reasons for depriving rights, though it
would appear that status-worthy treatment is really a sub-part of less clearly defined
legitimate penological objectives governing inmates).
138
See supra notes 95-97 (describing how and when Pavulon is implemented as the last
step prior to death-inducing sodium chloride injection); Hill v. McDonough, 126 S. Ct. 2096
(2006); supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text (permitting a challenge to the use of
Pavulon as an unnecessary component of the Florida lethal injection protocol). See Walton,
497 U.S. at 670. But see Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 644 (2004) (noting that the death
penalty presupposes a means of carrying it out). Nelson has been taken to mean two things
about normal conditions of confinement cases: (1) that deliberate indifference (intent) is
required to show a Section 1983 breach of legitimate penological objectives; and (2) that the
protocol for lethal injection is part of the punishment itself because it is created by a
Department of Corrections with sole authority to mete out the punishment authorized by
statute or a sentencing judge. Taylor, 487 F.3d at 1080-82 (citing Wilson, 501 U.S. at 300,
302). In those usual cases, the inquiry is apparently whether the risk of pain is
unnecessary, rather than whether the components of the procedure are necessary.
However, even Taylor acknowledged, as had Nelson and Hill, that the new conditions of
confinement cases were unique. Id. at 1080-81. The situation with Pavulon is one that:
does not fit neatly within the general conditions-of-confinement
context because the conduct of which [one] complains is necessary to
carry out his punishment, as opposed to a mere condition of his
imprisonment. . . . [T]his claim is not the typical conditions-ofconfinement claim challenging prison conditions in general nor does it
involve the action of a particular officer that is not part of the
designated punishment for the crime.
Id. (citing Nelson, 541 U.S. at 644, which had difficulty categorizing this type of claim and
reconciling it with traditional method-of-execution analysis). Due to the uniqueness of the
situation, therefore, courts disregard the usual limitations such as specific intent and
pursue whether the necessary death penalty procedures carry substantial risks. Id. at 1080.
139
See supra notes 95-97, 106-07.
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arrest.140 Only the last injection, the lethal injection, constitutes the death
penalty punishment.
Initially, to rebut an inmate’s allegation that any other condition not
purporting to be punishment was gratuitously imposed, a government
defendant need only produce some conceivable penological justification
for the condition of confinement imposed or omitted.141 Nelson inferred
this minimal burden of penological justification when it held that
gratuitous circumstances of confinement preceding the execution
punishment itself might be found cruel and unusual apart from casting
judgment on the validity of the death penalty as a whole.142 Method-ofexecution analysis implies some threshold burden upon government
officials, because standards of decency are to be balanced only against
objectives befitting the modifiers “legitimate,” “penological”
objectives.143 Furthermore, a showing of penological interest is the
constitutional minimum expected when depriving prisoners of otherwise
retained constitutional rights in First Amendment conditions of
confinement cases.144
Notwithstanding these numerous inquests for penological objectives
alone, it must be stressed that the public official’s bar is not very high;
the rationale offered at this stage need only be a legally sufficient reason

140
See Louisiana ex rel Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463 (1947). This approach fits
squarely within Eighth Amendment condemnation of gratuitous (meaning surplus) or
unnecessary pain and suffering. Hill, 126 S. Ct. at 2102. Were a condition of confinement
not necessitated by penological interests, it would at least be gratuitous, if not thereafter
cruel pain or suffering as well. The Court in Hill legitimated bifurcation between necessity
and cruelty when, in determining the Eighth Amendment issue, it held that the use of
Pavulon was not necessary (that is, a penological necessity) to the state execution
procedure and remanded for a determination on the issue of whether inmate Hill could
more than likely succeed on the merits (that is, whether there was a substantial risk of
gratuitous pain and suffering). 126 S. Ct. at 2100-02; see supra note 132 (explaining the
bifurcated approach of this Note); Workman v. Bredesen, 486 F.3d 896, 902-03, 919 (6th Cir.
2007) (discussing the virtues and drawbacks of one, two, and three-chemical execution
protocols); infra note 175 (explaining that the punishment only includes sodium thiopental
(anesthesia) and Pavulon (muscle relaxant) to potassium chloride for other, nonpunishment reasons: the former to ensure unconsciousness and the latter to mask the
appearance of convulsions and prevent confusion of witnesses, to preserve the dignity of
the inmate and the process, and to ensure non-resuscitation).
141
This framework is borrowed from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973), which governs Title VII intentional discrimination in the employment context and
has not generally been used in Section 1983 jurisprudence; see supra note 132.
142
541 U.S. 637, 645 (2004) (emphasis omitted).
143
See supra note 29 (concerning the balance between decency and objectives).
144
Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822-23 (1974); see supra notes 80-82 and accompanying
text.
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for imposing a condition of confinement, not the actual reason.145
Penological state interests are by definition presumed legally sufficient,
because legislatures are bound by the Constitution and laws when they
promulgate criminal punishments and operate correctional systems.146
In response to such reasonable requirements from state defendants,
government officials have nonetheless waged various doomsday
assertions forecasting that conditions of confinement claims would open
the floodgates to improper inmate claims.147 However, the PLRA places
limits on conditions of confinement claims ascribed in Nelson and Hill
and quells the need for fear, whether in frivolous or malicious cases or
where damages or injunctive relief would be otherwise inappropriate.148
Indeed, a prisoner’s prima facie claim must still specifically allege a
substantial risk of unnecessary pain, particularized harm, and a specific
condition of confinement which threatens both.149 If the preliminary
government burden comports with reason, precedent, and public
concern, inmates will only succeed in alleging unconstitutional risks in
the first instance where state defendants offer no penological justification
whatsoever for the same specific feature of confinement protocol.

145
See supra note 141; supra note 55 (referencing CARTER & KREITZBERG, supra note 18, for
the proposition that a punishment must at least be authorized by law to be necessary); supra
note 25 (noting Granucci, supra note 23, as saying necessary punishment is proven, codified
punishment).
146
See, e.g., supra note 20; Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96 (1958). See Rhodes v. Chapman,
452 U.S. 337, 352 (1981).
[C]ourts cannot assume that state legislatures and prison officials are
insensitive to the requirements of the Constitution or to the perplexing
sociological problems of how best to achieve the goals of the penal
function in the criminal justice system: to punish justly, to deter future
crime, and to return imprisoned persons to society with an improved
change of being useful, law-abiding citizens.
Id.
147
See Nelson, 541 U.S. at 649; Hill v. McDonough, 126 S. Ct. 2096, 2102 (2006); Weinstein
& Dolan, supra note 93.
148
Nelson, 541 U.S. at 649-50 (speaking to an equitable presumption against manipulation
and unnecessary delay by claimants); Hill, 126 S. Ct. at 2104; see supra notes 104, 106
(highlighting that this case was controlled by Nelson and only expanded upon it, so both
applied PLRA limits under Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 749 (2004)); supra notes 100,
109-10, 126 and accompanying text (listing relevant PLRA provisions and the effect on
Section 1983 actions).
149
Hill, 126 S. Ct. at 2096 (citing Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997)), which
deemed preliminary injunctive relief unavailable unless the aggrieved party, by a burden
of persuasion, demonstrates the significant possibility of success on the merits). See supra
notes 7, 134 (concerning the deliberate indifference standard for showing substantial risk of
cruel and unusual punishment).
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Retribution

Despite the fact that the state defendant’s rebuttal burden is quite
low, certain interests will not be penological in conditions of
confinement situations and, thus, should not survive a facial challenge
that they are gratuitous or unnecessary. Retribution, although a
penological justification for capital punishment itself, cannot
simultaneously be a penological justification for non-punishment
conditions of confinement.150 Retribution is merely a reason for bringing
prisoners to a certain kind of justice.151 It asserts a legislative interest in
the proportionality of the death sentence for various crimes and
criminals rather than a legislative or correctional interest in particular
conditions or practices prior to executions.152
Moreover, retribution is too dangerous an interest to be permitted to
pass this stage of conditions of confinement determination.153 Ideally,
method-of-execution analysis places ever-enlightened public standards
of decency as the first line of defense against rampant invocation of the
penological retribution of right.154 However, society as a whole is also
capable of devolving standards of decency and of consequently
persuading the judiciary to offer a merciless solution.155 A better
See supra notes 80-82, 134. Retribution, while one of the goals of the penal function
according to Rhodes, is not one of the goals of the corrections system, according to Pell v.
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822-23 (1974). Trop declared that penal functions are those aiming
at punishment, quite apart from other legitimate interests which are non-penal in function.
Trop, 356 U.S. at 96, 110. In Walton, Justice Scalia, concurring, also recognized the
distinction between punishment and process. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 277, 670 (1990).
151
See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (deeming retribution a “social
purpose[]” for the death penalty).
152
See supra note 150; supra Parts II.B.2-3 (discussing proportionality and retribution
under habeas).
153
For instance, so long as retribution is justified as something the government deserves
to do rather than something simply within its legitimate powers, the basis for retribution
borders on some perceived divine right, which can never be trumped. Governments which
believe they do not wield the sword in vain or otherwise taking “an eye for an eye” tend
toward authoritarian systems of government. See COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 18, at
31; supra note 62 (contrasting Biblical and theological support for “eye for an eye”
governmental rights with Jesus’ apparent repudiation of such behavior); DRIMMER, supra
note 62 and accompanying text (on the idea of deserving).
154
See supra note 29 and accompanying text (laying out method-of-execution analysis and
how, according to Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977), it generally works to measure
either proportionality or legitimate penological interests against standards of decency but
not proportionality and penological interests against one another).
155
See, e.g., Domino & Boccaccin, supra note 3, at 61 (public bloodlust and desire to
humiliate convicts); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173 (public opinion more than anything drives
standards of decency); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 308 (1972) (noting how mob justice
is often at the ready if governments’ handling of executions is unsatisfactory); Ewart, supra
150
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safeguard against wanton and unnecessary conditions of confinement is
the concept of legitimate penological objectives itself, one that poses an
independent barrier to vengeful, cruel, and unusual conditions of
confinement not attendant to death itself.156 Unlike standards of
decency, the definition of penology does not purport to evolve or
devolve at the social whim.157
Furthermore, no pre-conceived penological legislative objective
could be implemented if cruel, unusual, and unconstitutional on its
face.158 In all instances of conditions of confinement, the Eighth
Amendment in its very words “cruel and unusual” implies that, were it
legitimate and penological, retribution must at least be implemented by
dispassionate government officials, with the end of death alone and not
wanton or unnecessary pain and suffering.159 Acceding accidents alone,
lawful retribution does not qualify as a penological justification for
alleged prisoner maltreatment prior to the actual punishment
sanctioned.160 Any condition of confinement which does purport to be
note 36, at 1162 (noting how shifts or maturation in the public mindset have carried this
country from method to method of execution and from punishment to rehabilitation foci);
COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 18, at 29 (giving one example of that mob justice); Domino
& Boccaccin, supra, at 73, 74 (hypothesizing that victims’ family members may want to
observe executions in part to fulfill vengeful fantasies); Gardner, supra note 66, at 117
(introducing retributional maximum pain proponents); Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia,
448 U.S. 555, 571 (1980) (explaining an angry public’s proclivity for “vengeful ‘self-help’”);
supra note 22 (discussing the Kemmler execution, the first one done by electric chair, as
flowing from court acquiescence to the public’s whimsical motivations).
156
See supra notes 39, 155 (highlighting the possibility of devolved standards of decency
in society, especially under contemporary standards of decency criteria).
157
See supra notes 20, 134, 150 (providing support for the premise that penology itself is a
timeless reference to a static concept within criminology). Even though generations may
differ as to what interests constitute penological ones or may forfeit consideration of
penological objectives altogether, the term itself is ubiquitous and inalterable.
158
See Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135-36 (1879). Congress or state legislatures
similarly cannot constitutionally project penal, punishment-driven objectives upon nonpenal, non-punishment conditions of confinement. See Trop, 356 U.S. at 96.
159
See Kearns, supra note 5, at 228-29. “[T]he death penalty . . . must not be a celebration
of horrific violence and revenge. It is supposed to be the ‘mere extinguishment of life.’” Id.
at 299 (citing Wilkerson, 99 U.S. 130 and In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1891)). Trying to
subject an executee to as much pain as his or her victims must have suffered is out of the
question under the Eighth Amendment. See Gardner, supra note 61, at 117 (regarding
maximum pain proponents).
160
See supra note 65 and accompanying text (mentally detached officials). For the act to
have been deliberate with a culpable mindset, the subjective recklessness showing must
demonstrate actual knowledge of wrongfulness on the part of the prison official, including
deliberate failure to protect an inmate if need be. E.g., McHenry v. Chadwick, 896 F.2d 184,
188 (6th Cir. 1990). See, e.g., Williams v. Greifinger, 97 F.3d 699, 706 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding
that forcible confinement within a small cell without opportunity for exercise was
particularly wrongful deliberate indifference); supra note 132 (about the deliberate
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punishment but was not a prisoner’s actual sentence, much less one that
serves no penological purpose related to the status of prisoners, is
gratuitous under Nelson and Hill and should bow to prisoners’ retained
rights.161
C. Legitimate Necessity: Penological Objectives Assessed as Applied
Once a court is satisfied that the government defendants have
produced some penological justification for causing otherwise cruel and
unusual conditions of confinement, that court must entertain whether
the rationale was a legitimate reason for depriving prisoners’ rights.162
The death row inmate would have to prove that the penological
interest(s) offered were improper as applied—a mere pretext for some
actual, unsavory objective motivating the condition of confinement, or
else excessive and unnecessary.163 If penological justification was the
legal sufficiency of conditions imposed, then legitimacy is their factual
sufficiency, a question of whether the challenged conditions of
confinement are rational under the circumstances.164 If the inmate
indifference standard generally); see also Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.2d 662, 687 (9th Cir. 1994)
(acknowledging that accidents cannot be constitutionally prohibited). But see supra notes
134, 138; infra notes 163, 213-14.
161
See supra note 134 (discussing what purports to be punishment); Price v. Johnston, 334
U.S. 266, 285 (1948); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822, 825-26 (1974) (treatment warranted
by status of prisoners); Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 645-47 (2004); Hill v. McDonough,
126 S. Ct. 2096, 2102 (2006) (discussing how gratuitous means unnecessary); supra note 18
and accompanying text (concerning the principle of prisoners’ retained rights). See, e.g.,
Hill, 126 S. Ct. 2096 (challenging usage of Pavulon as an established, or at least foreseeable,
element of the Florida lethal injection protocol based on past practices in the state).
162
See supra notes 107, 126 (describing how the Court in Hill and Nelson distinguished
circumstantially or legally necessary conditions of confinement from not strictly necessary
conditions).
163
See supra note 159. In an example provided by the film THE GREEN MILE, (Warner
Bros. 1999), a corrections official, with his own emotional or financial incentives, did not
wet the sponge which is placed on a prisoner’s head during an electrocution to assist the
electrical current, the end result being a horrifically painful and slow death. Wantonness
requires deliberate indifference, and deliberate indifference of correctional officials or
higher state officials requires intent to disregard a substantial risk of harm to an inmate.
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 844-47 (1994). Nevertheless, “the other benchmark the
court uses to identify Eighth Amendment violations [is] whether the punishment involves
‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” Workman v. Bredesen, 486 F.3d 896, 907 (6th
Cir. 2007) (quoting Nelson, 541 U.S. at 645) (emphasis added). Unnecessary punishment, as
already discussed, is synonymous with gratuitous and has no prerequisite of intent, nor is
it certain that cruelty is synonymous with deliberateness and thus requires intent. See supra
notes 23, 132; supra note 138 (highlighting how the court in Taylor, interpreting Nelson,
believed the usual specific intent requirement should be set aside in death penalty
conditions of confinement cases).
164
See supra notes 52, 62 (noting where the Courts in Gregg and Furman, respectively,
explained arbitrary jury proportionality determinations at the sentencing stage by favoring
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cannot disprove a legitimate penological interest, then the circumstances
should warrant deference to the penological interest proffered.165
Illegitimate penological interests in the death penalty context may be
legitimate government interests for the bulk of a prisoner’s confinement
conditions but irrational as applied in the execution chamber and to
lethal injection procedures specifically.166
Deterrence is a basic
penological interest to First and Eighth Amendment precedent, as is
administrative necessity in conditions cases.167 Each of these penological
objectives nonetheless carry various arbitrary connotations in modern
implementation when compared to death row inmates’ rights.
1.

Deterrence

Deterrence is one among many penological objectives that can be
either legitimate or illegitimate as applied.168 Deterrence from capital
crimes has traditionally been most successful and legitimate when the
public is emotionally and physically involved in capital punishment.169
the death penalty over imprisonment); Kearns, supra note 5, at 200 (describing how the
relatively small number of method-of-execution claims in over a century makes
determining what is arbitrary or unreasonable in Eighth Amendment cases difficult).
165
Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 135 (2003) (considering a valid, rational connection
between a regulation and legitimate government interests behind it). The existence of
obvious, easy alternatives may be evidence that the regulation is not reasonable, but the
regulation need not be the least restrictive in order to survive scrutiny. Id. “[W]e cannot
‘invalidate a category of penalties because we deem less severe penalties adequate to serve
the ends of penology.’” Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182-83 (1976) (quoting Furman, 408
U.S. at 451 (Powell, J., dissenting)). But see Hill, 126 S. Ct. at 2103 (not requiring the
prisoner challenging a feature of execution protocol to offer a substitute, because, although
in Nelson the inmate did offer central line procedure as an alternative to cut down
procedure for venous access, Nelson did not require it nor heighten Section 1983 pleading
requirements).
166
See supra notes 70, 129 and accompanying text (commenting on inapplicability of
special deterrence and rehabilitation state interests as applied to death row inmates, to the
extent that their treatment differs from that of other prisoners). “[S]ince most offenders
will eventually return to society, another paramount objective of the corrections system is
the rehabilitation of those committed to its custody.” Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 823
(1974) (implying that an interest in a prisoner’s rehabilitation is conditioned on his or her
expectable return to society).
167
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183 (where, in an Eighth Amendment habeas case, deterrence was
called one of the primary social purposes of the death penalty); Pell, 417 U.S. at 822-23
(explaining that, in a First Amendment Section 1983 case, deterrence is one of the legitimate
penological interests of the corrections system); see supra note 131 (explaining the concept
of administrative necessity).
168
See supra notes 71, 72 and accompanying text (commenting on the disputable power of
capital punishment’s deterrent effect in various contexts and for various audiences).
169
See Domino & Boccaccin, supra note 3 (describing how citizen involvement has
historically abated the likelihood of vigilantism). “Political and religious leaders of the day
were well aware that citizen support for the execution process was essential to the
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Public executions provided a lawful panacea for public anger and
psychological closure following heinous crimes, a societal consolation
prize for direct retribution against criminals.170 Accessibility to and
oversight of capital punishment was also a historically necessary
precondition for responsible state governments who wanted to earn and
keep the public confidence.171 Today, however, two of the government’s
own designs—private execution statutes and Pavulon in lethal injection
protocols—illustrate states’ tendencies to mitigate the death penalty’s
deterrent value.172
Although private execution statutes divested the public of death
penalty oversight only at its own request, they have simultaneously
created a legal chasm between those citizens and the likelihood of their
being deterred by capital punishment.173 Even assuming that the few
maintenance of public order and law-abiding behavior. Without this support criminal and
vigilante acts would possibly propagate.” Id. at 62. “[C]rime and consequence” was an
important message conveyed just prior to each scheduled public execution. Id. at 63.
Attendees were warned not to view their task as witnesses as simply an enjoyable
experience but as a social duty. Id.
170
See Gardner, supra note 61, at 113-18 (considering retributional expression of moral
outrage); Domino & Boccaccin, supra note 3, at 73-74 (highlighting initiatives led by victims’
families to observe executions and their expectation of “moral closure” from viewing a
criminal’s death).
171
See generally supra note 34 and accompanying text (making this observation in the trial
context). See COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 18, at 30 (quoting Weisberg, supra note 44):
Televised executions would mark the reversal of the
process . . . whereby executions have been removed further and further
from the community that compels them. Through the eighteenth
century, executions were atavistic spectacles performed in full public
view. In the nineteenth [century] they were moved inside the prison
yard and witnessed by only a few. In the twentieth century,
executions moved deep inside the bowels of prisons, where they were
performed ever more quickly and quietly to attract minimal notice . . . .
Invisible executions shocked the sensibilities of fewer people, and
dampened the momentum of the reform movement.
Id. But see Domino & Boccaccin, supra note 3, at 62 (noting that some, like eighteenth
century activist Benjamin Rush, were convinced that public displays of discipline would
lead to sympathy for the offender and criticism of government).
172
See supra note 35 (explaining the rise and scope of private execution statutes, or
otherwise repealed public execution statutes, in more detail); supra notes 95-96 and
accompanying text (describing how Pavulon and like chemicals operate and why their use
in lethal injection is challenged); Miller, supra note 47, at 231-32.
173
See supra note 35 and accompanying text (noting that the move from public to private
executions by law was instigated by either an increasingly squeamish or decent society).
The fourth factor in standards for preliminary injunction is the public interest. Workman v.
Bredesen, 486 F.3d 896, 905 (6th Cir. 2007). “In cases where the public interest is involved,
the district court must also examine whether the public interest favors the plaintiff,” taking
account of, in capital cases, states’ strong interest in carrying out their judgments. Morales
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witnesses who private execution statutes permit at executions are
personally dissuaded from crime, these statutes imply by precondition
that only a few law-abiding citizens and public officials will be invited to
attend an execution, rather than a larger and more impressionable
audience.174 This is not to say that privatized execution fails to serve any
valuable penological purpose, just that governments have consciously
sacrificed deterrence perhaps in the name of safety, other administrative
necessities, or their perceptions of decency.175 Deterrence is an unlikely
v. Hickman, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1040 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (citing Beardslee v. Woodford, 395
F.3d 1064, 1067-68 (9th Cir. 2005)). As applied in most cases, erroneously, the public
interest models verbatim only contemporary standards of decency and what legislatures
hold to be true. E.g., Workman, 486 F.3d at 906-07. See supra notes 41, 42 and accompanying
text. Nevertheless, “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society . . . admits of few absolute limitations.” Taylor v. Crawford, 487 F.3d 1072, 1080
(8th Cir. 2007). Rejection of public oversight, oversight which is in the public’s best
interests, ought to be the least of those limitations. Following the Morales decision,
Governor Schwarzenegger suggested that discussions about revamping the execution
system pursuant to Judge Fogel’s order be kept candid, which has met with accusations of
“shut[ting] Californians out of the debate over the death penalty.” Bob Egelko, Bid for
Public Discussion on Executions: Newspapers File to Prohibit Secretive Alteration of System, SF
GATE, Feb. 1, 2007 (quoting Atty. Karl Olson), available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2007/02/01/BAGB8NSOEG1.DTL&hw=Bid+for+Public+Discuss
ion+on+Executions&sn=002&sc=1000. “Florida Gov. Jeb Bush established an 11-member
commission on the same day as Fogel’s ruling to meet publicly and propose changes in that
state’s execution methods . . . . Bush’s action refuted any claim by California officials that
‘the review of the lethal injection procedure can flourish only in the dark.’” Id. (citing and
quoting Atty. Karl Olson). Moreover, California voters approved Proposition 59 in 2004, a
state constitutional amendment requiring that public agency meetings and writings of
public officials be open to public scrutiny. Id. Secrecy, it appears, is as “profoundly
inimical” to the death penalty as it is to the trial process. See Richmond Newspapers v.
Virginia, 448 U.S. 448, 593, 597-98 (1980).
174
See supra note 35 and accompanying text. Among the limited number of witnesses
permitted in the small space of most death chambers, “most states currently allow a
religious delegate, a physician, several individuals designated by the offender (e.g., family
members, attorneys), and others selected by a corrections official (e.g., members of the press), to
view an execution, though minors and other inmates are typically barred.” Domino &
Boccaccin, supra note 3, at 63-64 (emphasis added); see John D. Bessler, Televised Executions
and the Constitution: Recognizing a First Amendment Right of Access to State Executions, in 45
FED. COMM. L.J. 355, 362-64, 368-72, 369 (2000). As of 2000, the only states to permit
families of victims to observe the death sentence in progress were California, Illinois,
Louisiana, Pennsylvania, Texas, Virginia, and Washington. Domino & Boccaccin, supra
note 3, at 66.
175
See Workman, 486 F.3d at 902-03, 919 (discussing the virtues and drawbacks of one,
two, and three-chemical execution protocols); surpa note 95. According to the courts that
have reviewed it, “the whole point of the Tennesee lethal-injection protocol is to avoid the
needless infliction of pain, not to cause it. The idea is to . . . cause[] a quick and pain-free
death.” Id. at 907. Upon closer examination, however, masking involuntary movements is
obviously motivated by a mixture of penological and decency interests, rather than painaversion. It is a means to prevent “interfe[rence] with the proper functioning of the IV
equipment and [to] contribute[] to the dignity of the death process,” a humane death. Id. at
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justification for any particular condition of confinement when so very
few people are permitted to observe them.
In the same manner that private execution statutes make the threat
of death less credible, the paralytic agent Pavulon disengages witnesses
from being deterred by the harsh reality of death.176 Unlike private
execution statutes, however, Pavulon is a specific condition of
confinement that an inmate can challenge for substantially risking
gratuitous harm.177 The sole purpose of this drug is apparently to
present an inmate’s death in somatic form for witnesses, as more of a
peaceful sleep than a potent, conscience-jarring event.178 Accordingly,
909, 918. Of course, a fundamental principal of penological interests is that “[t]he State,
even as it punishes, must treat its members with respect for their intrinsic worth as human
beings. A punishment is ‘cruel and unusual,’ therefore, if it does not comport with human
dignity.” Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 270-71 (1972). Tennessee retained Pavulon
largely because it would “typically result in involuntary movement which might be
misinterpreted as a seizure or indication of consciousness.” Workman, 486 F.3d at 903.
Such convulsions are “a phenomenon the State understandably wished to avoid out of
respect for the dignity of the individual and presumably out of respect for anyone,
including the inmate’s family, watching the execution.” Id. at 909. A side effect of
respectfully fooling people is to shield them from the horror that enables deterrence.
Furthermore, Pavulon is not entirely viewed as a humane additive for dignified purposes.
As an added measure, Pavulon also conveniently prevents respiration, which is touted to
help ensure that an inmate, though potentially suffering, doesn’t retain consciousness.
Henry Weinstein & Dolan, supra note 93, at 3.
176
Lethal injections which use Pavulon make death appear “so denatured and
mechanistic as to be unshocking even to most live witnesses.” COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra
note 18, at 31. At most, to assess an inmate’s stability through the fog of Pavulon-induced
paralysis, some states rely on heart monitors or camera observation by medical or
corrections officials sitting outside the death chamber in order to determine the nearness to
and moment of a prisoner’s death. Id. (observation by camera); Kearns, supra note 5, at
220, n.225 (procedures for carrying out an execution by lethal injection) (heart monitors);
see supra note 93. According to Michael Kroll of the Death Penalty Information Center,
inability to watch televised executions, like being denied personal access to executions, is
one more layer of removal from the process that undermines the gravity of death by lethal
injection. See DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, supra note 72.
177
Hill v. McDonough, 126 S. Ct. 2096 (2006).
178
See generally ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (Harper Collins 1932) (a novel in
which soma is a drug that all of society takes to remain in a placid, blissfully ignorant
frame of mind, in part to make their continual implementation of discrimination, slavery,
and euthanasia more palatable). Dr. Heath of Columbia University has remarked: “It’s
hard to see what the role of pancuronium is in an execution.” Witt, supra note 93, at 8.
Judge Ellen Hobbs Lyle, during the course of one such Tennessee case, opined that, as a
worst-case scenario, the drug was motivated by the “state’s interest in demonstrating to
witnesses that the death penalty procedure is painless . . . . ‘The subject gives all the
appearances of a serene expiration when actually the subject is feeling and perceiving
excruciating painful ordeal of death by lethal injection.’” Id. Thus, the pancuronium
bromide, according to Judge Lyle, “gives a false impression of serenity to viewers, making
punishment by death more palatable.” Id. Indeed, Attorney General Dane R. Gillette,
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even for witnesses and public officials personally observing a lethal
injection, Pavulon promotes only benign and incidental effect on the
criminal conscience.179
Death row inmates and the public have a common interest in
rejecting the supposed dignity and predictability Pavulon offers, and
unresponsive legislatures ought not to be allowed the deference to
sanction a procedure so illegitimately employed.180
Pavulon is
challenged because it induces paralysis, making it nearly impossible for
execution technicians, much less the attending public, to decipher and
act upon physical clues to botched executions as compared to those
executions that stay within constitutional bounds.181 As long as Pavulon
or any kind of chemical or physical veil is used, witnesses cannot
observe procedural inadequacies and prompt public officials to rework
alleged gratuitous deficiencies in the lethal injection protocol.182 Like
private execution statutes, Pavulon marginalizes public involvement in
the death penalty. To the extent that either type of device is used,

during the course of the Morales trial, said that use of a single drug overdose would be
ugly, slow, and not pretty to watch. Weinstein & Dolan, supra note 93, at 3. This interest is
quite different than a purported interest in preserving a prisoner’s dignity. See supra note
177.
179
In an essay titled “Reflection on the Guillotine,” Albert Camus relayed what truly
intentional deterrence would look like:
If the penalty is intended to be exemplary, then, not only should the
photographs be multiplied, but the machine should even be set on a
platform in Place de la Concorde at two p.m., the entire population
should be invited, and the ceremony should be put on television for
those who couldn’t attend. Either this must be done or else there must
be no more talk of exemplary value. How can a furtive assassination
committed at night in a prison courtyard be exemplary? At most, it
serves the purpose of periodically informing the citizens that they will
die if they happen to kill—a future that can be promised even to those
who do not kill. For the penalty to be truly exemplary, it must be
frightening.
COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 18, at 29.
180
See, e.g., supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text (describing the advantages of an
evolving standards of decency approach).
181
See Morales v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972, 980 (N.D. Cal. 2006); supra notes 93, 176
(noting that heart monitors and video cameras make it more likely that attendants will
recognize execution problems, but not that those methods are better than firsthand
observation); COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 18, at 87 (describing how, in a perfectly
executed lethal injection, witnesses’ only physical clue in the midst of an inmate’s paralysis
is the sound of that person’s tongue dropping back in the person’s throat upon death).
182
See supra notes 32, 36 (public’s power to affect change in standards of decency and
consequently states’ methods of execution). Even though the media or other witnesses are
limited to word of mouth or print publication of what they have observed, documentation
of botched executions can still hold governments accountable for their practices.
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governments would seem to lack a penological interest in the
punishment’s deterrent value, much less the deterrent value that those
lesser-included components such as Pavulon bring to the execution
procedure.
2.

Administrative Necessity

States have numerous legitimate penological interests vested in
lethal injections protocol and other related conditions of confinement.183
Legislatures themselves tend to assume some broad oversight over the
death penalty, enacting statutes like the AEDPA or PLRA to maintain
efficient capital punishment and restrict non-meritorious prisoner
claims.184 Additionally, Hill held that penological necessity includes
lethal injection procedures which, as a matter of law or fact, are integral
to the punishment.185 Chief among legitimate penological interests in the
death penalty is legislative deference to a Department of Correction’s
administration as the vehicle for effectuating the state’s penological
interests in death penalty particulars.186 Departments of Correction in
turn may authorize any lawful and administratively necessary
penological decisions with the force of law.187
Current circumstances, however, indicate that administrative
implementation of the death penalty is marred by non-transparency, bad
183
See supra note 126. Chief among state interests in their considered lethal injection
protocols, or any one feature of those protocols, is saving legislative, judicial, and agency
resources and costs which would incur each time all or a portion of the execution method is
deemed unconstitutional. Nelson, 541 U.S at 644, 650. Additionally, states’ ultimate
punishments may lose some of their deterrent and retributive power each time their
methods are constitutionally embarrassed in the courts. See supra notes 60, 66, and
accompanying text.
184
See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text (AEDPA); supra notes 109-10 (PLRA).
185
Hill v. McDonough, 126 S. Ct. 2096, 2101-03. Through means of the Heck rule and the
PLRA, the Nelson Court preserved habeas-like deference to states’ deliberately chosen
death penalty methods and protocols in conditions of confinement cases. Nelson, 541 U.S.
at 646-650.
186
E.g., IND. CODE § 35-38-6-1(d) (2006) (Indiana); Hill, 126 S. Ct. at 2100 (Florida);
Abdur’Rahman v. Bredesen, 181 S.W.3d 292, 306 (Tenn. 2005) (Tennessee).
187
See supra note 186; Nelson, 541 U.S. at 644 (“imposition of the death penalty
presupposes a means of carrying it out”). In response to the contention that Department of
Corrections protocols in other states should not be considered strong evidence for
contemporary standards, the court in Abdur’Rahman said that protocols necessarily follow
from enacting legislation in which legislatures establish methods of execution.
Abdur’Rahman, 181 S.W.2d at 306; TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-23-114(c) (West 2006) (“The
department of correction is authorized to promulgate necessary rules and regulations to
facilitate the implementation this section”); see also IND. CODE § 35-38-6-1(d) (enabling the
Indiana Department of Corrections discretion to implement regulations consistent with its
lethal injection statute); supra note 83.
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faith discovery, inadequate executioner training and screening, and other
forms of clandestine irresponsibility which can neither legitimately
purport to be penological, administrative necessity, nor to prevent
serious Eighth Amendment risks to death row inmates.188 The first layer
of failed administrative necessity, although not the cause in fact of
gratuitous conditions of confinement, is a lack of legislative oversight.189
Legislatures which summarily authorize capital punishment by statute
have deferred rather standardless discretion to the Departments of
Correction officials who enact those punishments, disclaiming any duty
of ongoing legislative and public oversight of capital punishment
protocols.190
The greatest need for legislative and public oversight is in areas
where Departments of Correction appear inept at lethal injection
implementation, aspects which no amount of regular walk-through
procedures or remote video monitoring of executions alone could
correct.191 Most noticeably, execution technicians are dependent on
medical professionals or at least their own medical aptitude.192 Because
much-needed medical practitioners tend to ethically recuse themselves
from participating in lethal injection, corrections officials, often without

188
E.g., Morales v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972, 979-80 (N.D. Cal. 2006); Miller, supra note
47, at 231-32; see supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text.
189
See Abdur’Rahman, 181 S.W.3d at 312 (quoting one court’s refusal to impose public
opinion and formal requirements on lethal injection procedures which, in its
understanding, only concerned inter-correctional activities); supra notes 88-89.
190
See supra notes 83, 86-89, 93; Gordon, supra note 2, at 362-63, n.41.
191
See supra notes 93, 98, 176, 181. States which believe death row affords a lesser
standard of care than in medical practice believe these measures are justified by security
concerns. Workman v. Bredesen, 486 F.3d 896, 909-10 (6th Cir. 2007). Bureaucratization of
the process makes both blame and responsibility exceedingly hard to place. The account of
an execution official in charge of flipping the electric switch at the botched execution of
Jesse Joseph Tafero shows that no official is independently allowed to end the procedure;
even though the official noticed torture in progress, he only turned the switch on and off as
directed while Tafero’s head roasted. COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 18, at 84.
192
See supra notes 47, 97, 130. Doctors face a dilemma: being ethically barred from
participation or leaving the procedure in the hands of less competent personnel, who will
likely increase the risk of needless suffering. COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 18, at 107.
Dr. Ralph Gray opted to be integral to the first lethal injection—of Charles Brooks in Texas
in 1982. He even monitored Brooks’ heartbeat by stethoscope. Id. But see supra note 47
(noting that, in states where the standard of care is reduced, the general consensus is that
properly trained correctional officers are permitted to perform anesthesia and monitor an
inmate’s lethal injection in lieu of medical professionals).
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medical training or guidance, have occasionally botched the technically
demanding components of those executions.193
Less obviously, states have generally not formalized their lethal
injection protocols into documented rules or regulations, providing
themselves some insulation from not only potential liability and
embarrassment but also from greater public oversight and inmate
access.194 The practice of statutorily excluding lethal injection protocols
from administrative publication in turn encourages correctional higherups to be content with under-documented and non-peer-reviewed
performance criteria for lethal injection protocols.195 Some protocols, as
noted, are never even reproduced out of the handwritten notes of the
correctional officers who use them.196
These practices offend the traditions of public oversight at
executions and public trials as well as the discovery needs of death row
inmates.197 Prisoners attempting to challenge execution protocol on

193
See supra note 47 (describing why medical professionals feel it unethical to assist in
capital punishment); supra note 130 (noting the California Attorney General’s view that
without willing medical personnel present, lethal injection is practically impossible); Miller,
supra note 47, at 231-33 (describing one estimate of the number of botched executions and
their causes by 2001); supra note 48 (discussing failed executions). Nevertheless, sometimes
the interest in security and in having correctional officials at a distance seems to make
sense. Workman, 486 F.3d at 909-10. In 1988, Raymond Landry was to be executed when
his intravenous chemical lines burst and sprayed all over witnesses and technicians who
were close to the inmate’s body. COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 18, at 104.
194
See supra notes 34, 80-82 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Abdur’Rahman v. Bredesen,
181 S.W.3d 292, 311, 312 (Tenn. 2005).
[A] ‘rule’ does not include ‘[s]tatements concerning only the internal
management of state government and not affecting private rights,
privileges or procedures available to the public, nor does a ‘rule’
include ‘statements concerning inmates of a correctional facility’ . . . .
[W]e have previously held that the Department of Correction’s prison
disciplinary procedures were not ‘rules’ under the UAPA . . . .
Accordingly, we conclude that the procedures in the lethal injection
protocol were not ‘rules’ adopted by the Department of Correction in
violation of the UAPA and that the petitioner is not entitled to relief on
this ground.
Id.; see supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text. But see Richmond Newspapers v.
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571, 597-98 (oversight expected in the courtroom).
195
See Morales v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972 (N.D. Cal. 2006); Miller, supra note 47, at 23133; supra notes 87-89, 92 and accompanying text. But see Workman, 486 F.3d 896.
196
See Gibeaut, supra note 92 and accompanying text.
197
See supra notes 34, 64 and accompanying text (traditions of public oversight at
executions and of oversight at trials); see also Morales, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 982 (“Defendants
still have not fulfilled their discovery obligations.”); Workman v. Bredesen, 486 F.3d 896,
919 (6th Cir. 2007) (“An examination of best practices from other jurisdictions . . . suggests
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Eighth Amendment grounds encounter the difficult task of obtaining
access to these unpublished and unreproduced original state manuals.198
If death row inmates gain access to these materials, their previously
speculative fears of inexpertise and non-penological state directives may
well be vindicated.199 What is more, inmates may only be able to access
lethal injection protocol descriptions in the manner currently intended
by their State when the time left for filing a Section 1983 or habeas claim
is dangerously close to the eleventh hour.200 At that point, courts have
often dismissed claims which only temporary stays of execution could
resolve without realizing that the true motivation behind late appeals,
upon some deeper digging, might be the genuine lack of prior
opportunities.201
Thus, not all administrative and legislative assumptions can justly be
termed legitimate penological necessities. Without formal avenues for
auditing the qualifications of lay executioners, poorly performed

that accountability would be enhanced through improved documentation of these
processes.”).
198
See supra note 107. “On November 29, 2005, the Governor of Florida signed Hill’s
death warrant, which ordered him to be executed on January 24, 2006. Hill requested
information about the lethal injection protocol, but the department provided none.” Hill,
126 S. Ct. at 2100. The Hill court said Mr. Hill could not have access to the same procedural
documents, but had to rely on the portions described in Sims instead. Id. Without the same
kind of access, Hill’s complaint could do no better than requesting preliminary injunction
“barring defendants from executing Plaintiff in the manner they currently intend.” Id.
199
See Miller, supra note 47, at 231-32.
[M]any states have clandestine execution procedures. Some states
allow witnesses to view executions, and these witnesses often become
the reporters of botched executions . . . because of the drugs used in
lethal injections, witnesses may not be able to observe that a prisoner is
in severe pain.
Id.
200
See supra note 75 and accompanying text (noting the AEDPA’s purpose is to bar
unduly delayed attempts at equitable relief). Compare Hill, 126 S.Ct. at 2100 (lethal injection
execution), with Gomez v. United States Dist. Court for Northern Dist. of California, 503
U.S. 653 (1992) (per curiam) (execution by cyanide gas). When Clarence Hill was sentenced
on November 29, 2005, his scheduled execution date was January 24, 2006. Hill, 126 S. Ct.
at 2100. The Court in that case saw the delay as an abusive eleventh hour attempt to
manipulate equitable remedies. Id. In Gomez, though the result was the same, the Court
noted that petitioner’s claim “could have been brought more than a decade [earlier].”
Gomez, 503 U.S. at 654.
201
E.g., Taylor v. Crawford, 487 F.3d 1072, 1074-75 (8th Cir. 2007) (concluding that
additional time for discovery and evidentiary matters and a hearing on the merits was
warranted, because when Mr. Taylor brought suit, the State’s intended procedure for lethal
injection was unwritten; the district court failed to set Mr. Taylor’s hearing on the merits in
a timely manner, and when the hearing was eventually held, it was held in an unjustly
expedited manner).
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executions could continue unabated.202 Unprofessional documentation
might save the states from potential embarrassment or Section 1983
challenges, but neither reason is a legitimate objective.203 Opposing these
less than honorable interests is a prisoner’s right of timely access to the
courts, uninhibited by nontransparent protocols, as well as a tradition of
public accountability whereby the people and the press act as checks on
arbitrary government action and as vigilant voices for humane execution
improvements.204 On the balance, non-transparency of death penalty
operations, the access to which would otherwise legally or morally be in
the prisoner and public interest, cannot be claimed as legitimate.205
IV. CONTRIBUTION
The approach of this Part is to adapt the aforementioned analysis
into a value-added method-of-execution test for death row prisoners’
Section 1983 and Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claims.
While modeled after the preeminent habeas method-of-execution
analysis, the test that follows also incorporates the essential aspects of
Nelson and Hill analysis, namely the hybrid rule from Heck, PLRA
limitations, and the prima facie requirement for a substantial risk of
harm, commonly determined by deliberate indifference or comparable
ignorance standards.206 It differs from core habeas Eighth Amendment
interpretations in that it addresses a death row inmate’s unique showing
of a substantial likelihood of success on the merits in conditions of
confinement cases, overrides a death row inmate’s constitutional rights
202
See Miller, supra notes 47-48 (citing the number of known botched executions between
1993 and 2001 and their likely causes).
203
See Morales v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972, 980 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (noting that there is no
substitute for first-hand observation, whether standardized or not, nor sufficient reason to
accept substitutes).
204
See supra notes 34, 64, 197.
205
Compare Morales, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 981 (“At the present time . . . . Defendant’s
implementation of California’s lethal-injection protocol lacks both reliability and
transparency . . . . This is intolerable under the Constitution.”), with Abdur’Rahman v.
Bredesen, 181 S.W.3d 292, 311-12 (Tenn. 2005) (“The protocol instead fits squarely within
two exceptions to the meaning of ‘rule’: statements concerning only the internal
management of state government and not affecting private rights privileges or procedures
available to the public . . . . and statements concerning inmates of a correctional or
detention facility”).
206
See supra note 29 and accompanying text (method-of-execution analysis, generally);
supra notes 109-13 and accompanying text (describing the present Nelson/Hill analysis for
death row inmates’ Section 1983 claims); supra notes 132, 160 (explaining why cruel intent,
while set aside for the purposes of analysis in this Note, is nevertheless important to many
final determination of cruel and unusual punishment); supra notes 138, 163, 213-14 and
accompanying text (urging the view that excessiveness assumes ignorance or nonnecessity).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2008

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 42, No. 3 [2008], Art. 6

1010 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

only where legitimate penological objectives so suggest, and weighs only
those legitimate, penological objectives against evolving standards of
decency to determine whether cruel and unusual punishment has taken
place.207 The aim of this model judicial reasoning is to increase
governmental responsibility for the means they employ in executing
felons.208 It does not unavoidably cast judgment on capital punishment
itself, only on the level of discipline and expertise that capital
punishment jurisdictions ought to employ, with the aid of improved
public oversight.
A. The Proposed Test: Combining Hill with Method-of-Execution Analysis
The first requirement of the proposed test is that death row inmates’
alleged conditions or circumstances of confinement challenges satisfy the
basic requirements common to both the AEDPA and PLRA. If the
challenge is frivolous or malicious, posits a claim for which there is no
relief, names an immune defendant, is taken prior to administrative
exhaustion, or commits some other basic error, it should, as in current
practice, meet its early demise on the authority of either of these
statutes.209 If the claim comes in the eleventh hour, on the other hand,
courts should not presume the plaintiff is improperly motivated by
earning a temporary stay of execution in contravention of the AEDPA or
PLRA.210 The court may find at a later stage in this test that the state has
simply failed its discovery obligations, either by not publishing its
procedures and protocols in easily accessible form or perhaps by being

See generally supra Part III; see supra note 100 and accompanying text (explaining core
habeas actions, as distinct from hybrid actions and conditions of confinement actions under
the Heck rule).
208
At least one post-Hill decision has approached the issue of death row inmates’ Section
1983 claims in this way.
Defendants’ implementation of lethal injection is broken, but it can be
fixed . . . .
California’s voters and legislature repeatedly have
expressed their support for capital punishment. This case thus
presents an important opportunity for executive leadership . . . .
Should Defendants wish to retain a three-drug protocol, which it most
certainly is their right to do, they must address in a serious way the
broader structural problems in implementation outlined in this
memorandum.
Morales v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972, 974, 982, 983-84.
209
See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text (AEDPA); supra notes 100, 109-10, 126
(PLRA).
210
See supra notes 75, 197, 200 (comparing state interests in timely executions with inmate
access to necessary discovery materials).
207
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otherwise belligerent in withholding limited sources of information from
inmates interested in physical evidence.211
Second, the plaintiff must present a prima facie case, what Hill called
“substantial likelihood of success on the merits,” under Section 1983 and
the Eighth Amendment.212 Proving a deprivation under color of the
Eighth Amendment freedom from cruel and unusual punishment is
appropriate, according to Nelson, when a showing of deliberate
indifference to that constitutional right is made, though negligent
indifference might suffice as well.213 Deliberate indifference may be the
infliction of improper conditions of confinement or the omission of
humane conditions owed, which encompasses at least a sort of reckless
ignorance.214
The third step requires that the baseline state interests be penological
interests for implementing the specifically challenged aspects of an
execution procedure.215 The state defendant only needs to produce some
penology-based rationale for his actions in rebuttal of the prima facie
allegations.216 Some hybrid claims will part ways from the test at this
point and be assessed instead under traditional method-of-execution
analysis if the inmate challenges the one and only permissible method
and protocol for a state’s executions under its laws.217 Foreseeably, states
may use this opportunity provided by Nelson to write one specific
method into their statutes to avoid Section 1983 lawsuits.218 But if a state
has, in bad faith, authorized only one method of execution in its statute,
its interest would be strictly non-penal rather than penological and still
not survive this stage of this test if challenged.

211
See supra notes 88-89, 194-96, 198, and 200-01 (each discussing, in part, states’ efforts to
conceal their lethal injection protocols).
212
See supra notes 111-12 (discussing the demonstration that might be required to show a
risk of gratuitous harm).
213
See Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 643 (2004) (deliberate indifference); supra notes
138, 163 (something less than intent in Taylor and negligent indifference in Workman,
respectively); supra note 133. See generally Morales, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 972.
214
See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994)
(deliberately indifferent cruel and unusual punishment commission and by omission,
respectively); supra note 132.
215
See supra Part III.B.
216
See supra notes 132, 141 and accompanying text (state’s baseline rebuttal burden of
production).
217
Nelson, 541 U.S. at 645. See generally supra notes 100, 103-04, 108 (distinguishing
permissible methods from possible methods).
218
See Kearns, supra note 5, at 211.
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Fourth, an inmate must establish that the penological interests
offered were not legitimately applicable to the circumstances of
confinement under review.219 Proof that the penological interests were
illegitimate under the circumstances—that is, that they were a mere
pretext for cruel and unusual punishment—would mean that a prisoner
retains his Eighth Amendment rights and may potentially be entitled to
injunctive relief, damages, or otherwise under Section 1983, aside from
remedies attendant to the Eighth Amendment substantively.220 Hybrid
claims which have challenged the factual validity of the death penalty
might exit the test at this point and be bound for a habeas determination;
however, courts using this test may as well not force the issue, since part
five of this test is the same next step as in pre-Penry method-of-execution
analysis—Trop and Roper’s evolving standards of decency.221
The final part of this test is used when the governmental justification
appears to be thoroughly legitimate and penological. Unless the inmate
has proven his case for negligent, reckless, or deliberate indifference
previously, legitimate penological interests should earn the substantial
deference usually enjoyed under comparable habeas method-ofexecution analysis.222 The legitimate penological interests are then
balanced against standards of decency to determine a death row
inmate’s last chance for vindication.223 For various reasons, “evolving
standards of decency” is more appropriate to this test than
“contemporary standards of decency.”224
Measuring legitimate
penological interests that have already surpassed the rigors of parts one
through four of this test against contemporary standards would tend
toward a non-event—the two things are virtually indistinguishable
legislative determinations in reality.225 When measuring evolving

See supra Part III.B.
Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004) (stating that injunctive and monetary
relief are available under Section 1983); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 666-67 (1974)
(further describing when retroactive monetary relief is available).
221
See supra notes 38, 43 (highlighting the factors in Trop/Roper evolving standards of
decency).
222
See supra notes 60, 66, 126, 183 (describing rationale for deference).
223
See supra note 111 (referencing common tests of merits balanced against relative
hardships).
224
See supra notes 38-39, 42, 173 and accompanying text (offering a basic comparison of
the two frameworks, the advantages of evolving standards of decency, and its relationship
to the most up-to-date and best public interests).
225
E.g., Abdur’Rahman v. Bredesen, 181 S.W.3d. 292, 306 (Tenn. 2005). In the case of
Pavulon, if the state deems its usage legitimate and penological, contemporary standards
would simply confirm that result, because Pavulon is used in all but two lethal injection
death penalty jurisdictions. Id. That case, using a now obsolete analysis after Hill,
219
220
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standards, however, it is at least possible that courts could bring their
own judgment to bear to find a condition of confinement inherently cruel
and unusual, though having technically survived the previous test as a
legitimate penological interest.226
B. Some Forthcoming Implications of the Proposed Test
The proposed test implies several alterations to lethal injection as
currently employed, including correctional systems’ reliance on Pavulon,
private execution statutes, undocumented lethal injection procedures,
and inexperienced executioners. The overall goal of the test is to
encourage increased governmental accountability for capital punishment
by stricter enforcement in courts, statutes, rules, regulations, and lethal
injection protocols themselves.227
Courts, for their part in ensuring a move towards transparency and
professionalism, should, first, no longer permit retribution or deterrence
to be balanced against standards of decency as legitimate penological
rationale for the methods or procedures of execution employed, except to
the extent that executions are indeed made so sufficiently public as to
support deterrence rationale.228 Second, courts, in conjunction with other
branches of government, can and should make executions more publicly
accessible, because private execution statutes may be incompatible with
deterrence, much less the traditions of public oversight, of retributional
moral balance, and of evolving standards of decency in conditions of
confinement cases.229 Third, courts can and should find unconstitutional
the use of paralytic agents like Pavulon and any other gratuitous or
excessive execution features lending to unusual punishment if they are
also, cruelly, not remedied.230
Rather than wait for courts to exhaust the Pavulon issue, a proactive
legislative commitment to professionalism in death penalty

permitted even non-legitimately justified means where most states said the means were
still contemporarily decent. Id.
226
See Coker v. Georgia, 438 U.S. 584, 597 (1977); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 563
(2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313 (2003) (each stating that the Court’s judgment
“is” or “will be” “brought to bear” in Eighth Amendment cases); supra notes 39, 43.
227
Overall, the goal ought to be implementation of at least the “best practices” of all U.S.
jurisdictions. See Workman v. Bredesen, 486 F.3d 896, 919 (6th Cir. 2007).
228
See supra Parts III.A.1, III.B.1; supra note 175 and accompanying text (on valuing
deterrence).
229
See supra Part III.B.
230
See Hill v. McDonough, 126 S. Ct. 2096 (2006); Morales v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972
(N.D. Cal. 2006); Taylor v. Crawford, 2006 WL 1779035 (W.D. Mo. June 26, 2006).
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administration can save face for jurisdictions where currently there are
concealed, inadequate operations.231 The potential for litigation and
embarrassment can be powerful incentive to perfect humane execution
procedures and accommodate public oversight, both of which enforce
the traditional concept of evolving decency. States’ protocols for
execution should be put down in rule or regulation form to give the
public easier access and fulfill discovery obligations to inmates. Better
inmate access, in particular, advances both AEDPA and PLRA goals,
since it would enable prisoners with meritorious claims to more clearly
avoid the appearance of eleventh hour stay of execution opportunism.
Additionally, all executioners should be subject to more stringent
training requirements. Because medical professionals cannot be forced
to participate, courts conceded that properly trained correctional officials
may perform the task alone.232 States should then focus on honing the
technical skills of elite groups of dispassionate execution officials in the
proficient use of standardized protocols.
V. CONCLUSION
Capital punishment, as an institution, is not remotely coming to an
end in this country. Realizing that the punishment itself is as yet
constitutional, many death row inmates have tried desperately to
challenge the means by which they will be brought to their ends. This
approach has revealed more deficiencies in execution procedures than
were perhaps expected. In particular, this Note describes how Section
1983 claims disputing the conditions of prisoner confinement not only
suggest that the nation’s best procedures ought to be standardized in
order to eliminate the substantial risk of excessive suffering, but it
requires a probing inquiry into the justifications for each stage of the
death penalty process. State and federal governments should subject
death row inmates to only those conditions which protect the inmates’
best interests and promote transparency to the public. Any feature that is
not strictly necessary ought to be justified solely by legitimate
231
As noted previously, Tennessee and California are states that have taken or are taking
such steps semi-proactively. See Workman, 486 F.2d at 899 (explaining in detail the lethal
injection improvements in Tennessee); Morales, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 974-75 (describing the
court-ordered improvements in California procedure); Witt, supra note 93, at 8.
232
Because an execution is not a medical procedure, and its purpose is not
to keep the inmate alive but rather to end the inmate’s life . . . the
Constitution does not necessarily require the attendance and
participation of a medical professional. However, the need for a
person with medical training would appear to be inversely related
to . . . reliability and transparency.
Morales, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 983.
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penological interests. For the sake of dignity and decency, and in
accordance with our rules of law, we cannot abide by the inhumanity of
indifference or shallow objectives which, by design or in effect, subject
even our vilest offenders to worse treatment than is sanctioned by the
worst punishment available under law.233 The only truly responsible
goal for death penalty conditions of confinement is an aim of legitimate
penological objectives, and it can be accomplished through a new
understanding of prevailing principles which the nation’s maturing
standards and laws have come to rely upon.
Daniel R. Oldenkamp234

“The mood and tempter of the public in regard to the treatment of crime and
criminals is one of the most unfailing tests of the civilization of any country.” Melvin
Gutterman, Prison Objectives and Human Dignity: Reaching a Mutual Accommodation, 1992
B.Y.U. L. REV. 857 (1992) (quoting Winston Churchill, 1912).
234
B.A. Political Studies, Dordt College, 2004; M.A.L.S. Ethics and Values, Valparaiso
University, 2007; J.D. candidate, Valparaiso University School of Law, May 2008. I am
greatly indebted to my loving wife, Angela, for her encouragement and patience
throughout the preparation of this paper and to my parents, Robert and Linda, among
others, who have encouraged me to pursue the study and practice of law as a calling and
vocation.
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